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PYSCHOLOGICAL REVIEW PUBLICATIONS 





VOL. XXXV WHOLE GOGILS| Roh ae 
NO. 4 1 ere Lae 


ed 


Psychological MonoSgraphs 


EDITED BY 


SHEPHERD IVORY FRANZ, Univ. or Catir., So. Branco 
HOWARD C. WARREN, Princeton University (Review) 
JOHN B. WATSON, New Yorx City (Review) 


MADISON BENTLEY, Universtry or Itxrnors (J. of Exp. Psych.) 


S. W. FERNBERGER, University or PENNSYLVANIA (Bulletin) and 
W. S. HUNTER, Crark University (Index) 


An Experimental Study of the Self 
in Psychology 


BY 
ELISABETH WHEELER 4K MEN, 
WHEATON COLLEGE, NORTON, MASS. 


(From the Psychological Laboratory of Harvard University) 


PUBLISHED FoR THE AMERICAN PsyCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION 


By THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW COMPANY 


PRINCETON, N. J. 
ANp ALBANY, N. Y. 


Acrents: G. E. STECHERT & CO., Lonpon (2 Star Yard, Carey St., W. C.) 
Lerezic (Hospital St., 10); Paris (76, rue de Rennes) 


ahi ua 
4 ‘ i vay 
eh . 











With grateful acknowledgment of Professor 
Calkins’s painstaking and scholarly work, 
which first interested me in the problem of the 
self in psychology, and of Professor Boring’s 


frequent advice and encouragement. 


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HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 


CONTENTS 


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EXPERIMENTAL 


Experiments, Group I 


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HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 


The great divergence of opinion among psychologists as to 
whether we are or are not conscious of ourselves, and the con- 
tradictory reports of those psychologists, who admit that we are 
conscious of ourselves, upon the nature of such self-consciousness 
and upon the practicability of making such consciousness the 
object of psychological investigation, both emphasize the need 
for a further study of the self-experience. 

There are at present in the psychological field three main types 
of theory of the self, no one of which has as yet been thoroughly 
established from the point of view of experimental psychology. 


The Self of Scientific Psychology 


The first type to which reference has been made is the type of 
theory, embodying a conception of self commonly referred to by 
psychologists as the “self of scientific psychology.” 

J. S. Moore in The Foundations of Psychology has given the 
following brief summary of this conception of the self. 

“The ‘self’ of scientific psychology is merely a convenient 
term for the sum-total or interrelated system of all the experi- 
ences of any given individual from birth to death; just as the 
term ‘nature’ as used in the physical sciences stands for the 
sum-total or interrelated system of all physical phenomena, not 
for any ‘permanent’ and ‘unique’ reality underlying those 
phenomena. To go beyond this, and to speak of the Self or 
Nature as anything more than a sum-total of phenomena, is to 
leave the bounds of science and enter the realm of metaphysics.” * 

Professor Pillsbury has given perhaps the most detailed and 
painstaking exposition of the self from this point of view, and 
his discussion of the self may therefore be regarded as typical 
of the self of scientific psychology. 


‘J. S. Moore. The Foundations of Psychology, 1921, 75. 


2 ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


Professor Pillsbury’s description of the self is as follows: 

“The self is merely all that we are and know, organized, self- 
unified, and self-identical, a growing vital unity that as a whole 
is effective in every experience. When it is directed toward the 
control of action, we know it as will; when choosing from the 
many stimuli that offer, as attention; when interpreting the 
stimulus, as perception or judgment; when constructing new 
forms from old experiences, as reason. But it is the same every- 
where, always active, and active in very much the same way in 
every kind of mental process. With a self of this kind we do not 
need to abandon logic for emotion, nor need we, after some con- 
clusion has been painfully attained, abandon the results of our 
analysis and go back to our crude common sense prejudices. 
The self is at once an empirical fact and a logical interpretation 
of an empirical fact.” ? 

“Tt is a principle of explanation, but is immanent, not tran- 
scendent, effective not shadowy. It is a principle of unity that 
arises from experience and gives unity to experience, an identity 
that persists in experience and progresses with experience, a 
knower of mental states that develops from mental states, and 
is at the same time something empirically known, nothing mystical 
or mysterious in its nature or actions.” ? 

“ Both will and self I would class as functions. Will is the 
function of masses of experience, in part immediately present, in 
part more or less remote, so far as they are active in the control 
of action. In the same way I would define self as the function 
of all that we are, active in the interpretation of new experiences 
and in taking them up into the persistent unity of experience.” * 

Professor Pillsbury’s conclusions regarding the self-experience 
are based not upon controlled observation of the experience under 
experimental conditions, but upon the logic of deductive reason- 
ing which starts with experience as immediately given. 


*W. B. Pillsbury. The Ego and Empirical Psychology. Phil. Rev., 1907, 
16, 406. 

* Ibid., 407. 

*W. B. Pillsbury. The Ego and Empirical Psychology—A Reply. Psych. 
Bull., 1908, 5, 61. 


AN EXPERIMENTAL’STUDY OF THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY. 3 


Professor Pillsbury states in regard to his method of procedure, 
“ My starting point is the same as my critic’s, the mental content 
as immediately experienced. Our ways diverge only in that I 
believe that both mental content and self are abstractions that 
have existence only in so far as they can be made to explain 
experienced fact. . . . I turn then to immediate experience 
and endeavor to show that the functions that are usually assigned 
to the self can be derived from known aspects of the immediately 
given.” ’ 

The functions of experience to which Professor Pillsbury 
chiefly refers are the functions of persistence or endurance and 
of synthesis or unity. 

Appeal is made to the experimentally demonstrated facts of 
the retention by the organism of memorial associations, which 
cannot, however, be consciously recalled, of the determination of 
attention through association and the principle of congruence, of 
the control of consciousness through Aufgabe, of the importance 
of past experience in the phenomena of perception, action, emo- 
tion, will and feeling, and, finally, to the facts of dissociation of 
personality to establish the thesis that permanence and unity are 
functions of mental states conceived as active, not passive, and 
are not therefore functions of a self or knower transcending the 
mental states.° 

The old problem, how are mental states known, is met by the 
assumption that “knowing is but a process of combining old 
mental states with new. If there be a knower, it is experience as 
a whole. To know the self as self, so far as that is possible, is a 
process of the same kind.” 3 

“To take some one concrete act, if any act is concrete, and to 
bring it into connection with a wide mass of similar phenomena 
that interpret it, on the one side, and on the other, take it over 
into themselves to enrich them, is to know.” # 


* Tbid., 60. 

?W. B. Pillsbury. The Ego and Empirical Psychology. Phil. Rev., 1907, 
16, 393-396. 

* Tbid., 401-402. 

* Tbid., 402. 


4 ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


The whole position is perhaps best summarized in Professor 
Pillsbury’s book upon attention. 

“1. The idea of a self has usually been introduced to explain 
the fact that mind shows unity and self-identity, and that mental 
states do not exist merely but are known. 

‘2. These facts cannot be satisfactorily explained on the 
assumption of a mind apart from the states, but are perfectly 
explicable if we regard the interacting mass of experience as 
the self. 

‘3. Unity comes from the mental interaction of all elements 
of experience past as well as present. 

“4. Persistent self-identity finds its explanation in the fact 
that no experience is ever entirely lost, and that new experi- 
ences are never entirely new but are new arrangements of old 
experiences about a new element. 

“5. Mental states, like external objects, are known by be- 
ing taken up into existing types earlier crystallized from the 
experience.” ? 

To complete Professor Pillsbury’s picture of the self-structure, 
the following statement should be added: 

‘ What, on the mental side, is an organization of experience, is, 
on the physical side, an organization of the nervous system. 

Every phase of self-activity could be paralleled by brain activity.” ? 

Criticism: It is obvious from the foregoing summary of the 
self-experience that Professor Pillsbury places our knowledge of 
self upon the same basis as our knowledge of all other aspects 
of experience. 

The great difficulty with Professor Pillsbury’s position which 
identifies self with the entirety of experience, with “all that we 
are and know ’’® is the necessary deduction that we must be 
always self-conscious, a conclusion which contradicts the intro- 


*W.B. Pillsbury. Attention, 1908, 217-218. 


*W. B. Pillsbury. The Ego and Empirical Psychology. Phil. Rev., 1907, 
16, 405. 


* Ibid., 406. 


AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY 5 


spective reports of observers, wherever the self-experience has 
been made the object of special investigation.’ 

In view of the demonstrable fact that consciousness does not 
always and under all circumstances involve the self-pattern or 
configuration even when, according to Professor Pillsbury, all 
the details of the pattern are by hypothesis always present, 
entirety of experience, pure and simple, can not be regarded as a 
sufficient and satisfactory explanation of the phenomenon under 
discussion. 


Self of Sensationalistic Psychology 

The second general type of explanation offered for the self- 
experience, is the sensationalistic type which attempts to reduce 
the experience of self wholly or chiefly to complexes of kinaes- 
thetic or organic sensation. 

Professor James and Professor Titchener are the chief ex- 
ponents of this position. 

Professor James’s explanation of the self-experience based 
upon personal introspective observation is clearly and briefly set 
forth in the following paragraphs: 

“In a sense, then, it may be truly said that, in one person at 
least, the ‘ self of selves, when carefully examined, 1s found to 
consist mainly of the collection of these peculiar motions in the 
head or between the head and throat. 1 do not for a moment say 
that this is all it consists of, for I fully realize how desperately 
hard is introspection in this field. But I feel quite sure that these 
cephalic motions are the portions of my innermost activity of 
which [ am most distinctly aware. If the dim portions which I 
cannot yet define should prove to be like unto these distinct por- 
tions in me, and | like other men, it would follow that our entire 
feeling of spiritual activity, or what commonly passes by that 
name, 1s really a feeling of bodily activities whose exact nature 
is by most men overlooked.” * 

“Let the case be what it may in others, I am as confident as I 

*E. B. Titchener. A Note on the Consciousness of Self. Amer. J. Psych., 


1911, 22, 540-552. Cf. also infra, p. 11. 
*W. James. Principles of Psychology, 1890, 1, 301-302. 


6 ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


am of anything that, in myself, the stream of thinking, (which 
I recognize emphatically as a phenomenon) is only a careless 
name for what, when scrutinized, reveals itself to consist chiefly 
of the stream of my breathing. The ‘I think’ which Kant said 
must be able to accompany all my objects, is the ‘I breathe’ 
which actually does accompany them. ‘There are other internal 
facts besides breathing (intracephalic muscular adjustments, etc., 
of which I have said a word in my larger Psychology), and these 
increase the assets of ‘ consciousness,’ so far as the latter is sub- 
ject to immediate perception; but breath, which was ever the 
original of ‘ spirit,’ breath moving outwards, between the glottis 
and the nostrils, is, | am persuaded, the essence out of which 
philosophers have constructed the entity known to them as 
consciousness.” * 

Professor Titchener’s position is similar to that of Professor 
James, though Professor Titchener does not attempt a detailed 
description of the self-experience. 

In place of such description, Professor Titchener submits the 
following table of components of the self-experience, tabulated 
from the introspective reports of thirteen observers, and ar- 
ranged in order of frequency of the various component parts: 


HiOrganicncomplemes sa. uni. 12 
Misualsmagery, sir wont 10 
Atbecti ve processes na tantar's 8 (implied in 4 other cases ) 
Kinaesthetic complexes...... 8 (probably in other cases, 

merged in organic) 

Conscious attitudes) +0. 40a 4 
Verbal auditory images...... 4 
Cutaneous sensations ....:.. 2 


“The attitudes are those of responsibility (F), recognition of 
ownership of introspection (E), ownership of experience (D), 
and activity in background of consciousness (F).” ? 


*'W. James. Does “ Consciousness ” Exist? J. Phil., Psychol. & Sci. Meth., 
1904, 1, 491. 

*E. B. Titchener. A Note on the Consciousness of Self. Amer. J. Psychol., 
IDL 22-558, 


AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF.THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY 7 


The further statement is made that “ Self-consciousness ap- 
pears, in many cases, as an intermittent mode of conscious experi- 
ence. Like other conscious attitudes, it takes shape, explicitly or 
implicitly, under determination. And so far as our results go, 
the determination is usually social in character.’ } 


Criticism: Although Professor Titchener has undertaken an 
experimental study of the consciousness of self, the method of 
experimentation adopted is not the method of controlled intro- 
spection of an experience arranged under laboratory conditions. 
The method is on the contrary a questionnaire method, and the 
answers to the questions are in every case based upon remem- 
bered experience, not upon an experience under immediate 
observation. 

The conclusion that self-consciousness is intermittent is based 
upon the answers to the following question, eleven of the thirteen 
observers answering the question in the negative: 

““T am always, inattentively or attentively, conscious of my- 
self, whatever the other objects of my consciousness.’ Is this 
statement true, as a matter of experience, (a) in everyday life, 
(b) in the introspective exercises of the laboratory? ”’ * 

The conclusion that the self-experience usually arises under a 
determination which is social in character is based upon the 
answers of the eleven observers, who had decided in favor of the 
intermittence of self-consciousness, as against its omnipresence, 
to the question, “ Under what circumstances, then, is it likely to 
appear?” * Ten of the eleven observers report either implicitly 
or explicitly a social determination. 

The chart of components of the self-experience, quoted above, 
is compiled from answers to the following question, “Is the 
consciousness of self explicit (e.g., visual image, organic sensa- 
tions) or implicit (intrinsic to the nature of consciousness, in- 
herent in the course of consciousness)? Can you bring out the 


* Tbid., 551-552. 


* Tbid., 542. 
* Tbid., 548. 


8 ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


character of the self-consciousness by comparing or contrasting 
it with other phases of a total consciousness? ” * 

Professor Titchener has stated that he does not think it wise 
to press the data contained in these answers further than -is 
required for the compilation of the chart, although a study of the 
thirteen answers to the foregoing question shows that ten of 
the thirteen observers feel that the constituents of self-conscious- 
ness listed in the table do not give a complete description of the 
self-experience. Three of these ten observers describe the ex- 
perience of self as consisting “chiefly ’’ or “ for the most part ” 
of organic sensations and visual images. A fourth observer 
states that self-consciousness 


“involves organic sensations, and feelings of bodily position and of comfort 
and discomfort. In the presence of other people it is often connected in some 
way with their approval or disapproval ; and almost always, whether I am alone 
or not, there is a strong sense of my own approval or disapproval.” 2 


The reference of this observer to experiences of approval! and 
disapproval clearly involves a meaning factor which is not ac- 
counted for in Professor itchener’s charted components of 
self-consciousness, unless it be to some slight and undefined ex- 
tent included in the component of conscious attitudes. 

Portions of the answers of six other observers are quoted in 
order that the emphasis upon a meaning aspect of the self- 
experience, which is clearly included in the descriptions, but 
which is not represented in the compilation of the data therefrom 
may receive a fair measure of consideration. 

The reports are as follows. 

Dm. “. . . The self is a thing meant, a complex logical entity. 

But that logical entity is represented in the total consciousness of almost any 
moment in that way which I have already mentioned, viz., the habitual attend- 
ance of certain psychic groups. Other designatory terms, so to call them, are 
visual images of myself in a particular situation, also auditory images of my 


voice and of voices speaking to me, and again various combinations of these 
with kinaesthetic images of activity.” $ 


Dsf. “ The consciousness of self is not comparable with the consciousness of 
external objects. It is not explicit in the sense of coming as visual imagery or 


* Tbid., 545-546. 


* Ibid., 546. 
* Ibid., 546. 


AN EXPERIMENTAL SFUDY OF THE. SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY ' 9 


organic sensations. It is rather an inherent feeling or knowledge or attitude 
that tells me that I am that which has images and sensations. Not a conscious- 
ness of my physical self as the object of experience, but an underlying unique 
knowledge of myself as the experiencing subject. I cannot seem to be able 
to get at it or to analyze it further in introspection. Often it-is intense, but 
often it is merely the background of experience.” 1 

Ff. ‘Sometimes the self appears as a visual image, as if it were a thing 
apart and separate. The self to which I refer in my answer is, however, an 
intangible something, forming a sort of background, in which (as I have said) 
I can distinguish organic sensations.” 2 

Am. “. . . Besides the clear sensations in self-consciousness, there are 
always poorly defined visual images, such as translucent rays being projected 
from the region of my chest where the organic sensations are strongest, and 
meaning ‘I am the center of this experience.’ ” 

“The self-conscious experience seems more often to be a part of other 
experiences than a thing of itself. It colors the meaning of the others. In 
itself it resembles the experience of effort, but differs slightly in meaning and 
in its persistence.” 3 

Bm. “It seems to me that all sorts of sensations and feelings may refer to 
that which experiences, to that which owns and appropriates the experience. 
I cannot now be more explicit.” 4 

Em. “ Self-consciousness is partly explicit, manifest in a visual image of 
myself, organic sensations and kinaesthesis, and in part implicit, as when I 
recognize my introspections as material peculiarly my own, which E could not 
directly know.” 5 

It may fairly be concluded from a reading of these reports, 
that when the sensationalistic hypothesis of the self-experience 
is actually put to the experimental test, this type of explanation 
is inadequate to the task of dealing with all observable aspects 
of the experience, and particularly with just that aspect which 


characterizes the experience for the observer as a self-experience. 


Self of Self-Psychology 


A third type of theory of the self is that of which Miss Calkins 
is the leading exponent. The following brief summary char- 
acterizes this conception of the self. 

“The self is indefinable. To define is to assign the object 
defined to a given class and to distinguish it from other members 

* Tbid. 

* Tbid., 546. 
* Tbid., 547. 
“ Ibid. 
° Ibid. 


10 ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


of the class; and the self is sui generis and therefore incapable 
of definition. . . . The self, though indefinable, is not on this 
account elemental and thus indescribable. . . The characters of 
the experienced self on which the self-psychologists lay their 
emphasis are, first, its persistence or self-identity; second, its 
individuality or uniqueness; third, the fact that it is fundamental 
or basal to its experiences, and finally the fact that it is related 
to its environment, social and physical.” * 

“ By ‘self’ I denote the object of the observation expressed 
in the words ‘I am conscious of myself.’ . . . The self is a 
highly complex being which may be described by an enumeration 
of its characters. Among these characters of the self the fol- 
lowing are surely fundamental.”? A brief description is given 
of the following characteristics. 


1. Persistence. 

Change, development. 

Uniqueness. 

Complexity inclusive of perceptions, emotions, thoughts. 
Relatedness. 


ae 


‘All these characters, it must be added, are immediately ex- 
perienced. The self, thus described, is observed and not merely 
inferred; is, therefore, a psychological datum which is taken 
over into philosophy when reflection discloses that it is the unique 
fact which can neither be denied nor even doubted without being 
at the same time asserted.” ? | 

‘A self as psychic fact is not an object of philosophical argu- 
ment but of immediate consciousness. In other words, no ques- 
tion arises of its ultimate nature: it is taken for granted, as any 
object of any science is, without further investigation. Just as a 
mineralogist takes for granted that there are stones, and just as 
a zoologist takes for granted that there are animal bodies, so a 
psychologist takes for granted the existence of selves.”’ * 


'M. W. Calkins. Amer. J. Psychol., 1915, 26, 495-496. 
*M. W. Calkins. Psychol. Rev., 1917, 42, 279. 

* [bid., 280. 

*M. W. Calkins. Psychol. Rev., 1906, 13, 66. 


AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY 11 


Miss Calkins explicitly states that “ By self as fundamental 
fact of psychology is not meant . . . the psycho-physical or- 
ganism, body plus consciousness or body regarded as possessed 
of consciousness.” ' In other words, Miss Calkins rejects the 
conception of self as defined by Professor Pillsbury. Miss 
Calkins’s self is conceived as distinct from body, but related to it. 
In other words, “it precisely has a body, and does not consist 
in body, is not made up of body-and-mind.” ° 

The sensationalistic theory of self is also rejected on the basis 
of incompleteness of description. Miss Calkins repeatedly asserts 
that “the ‘idea’ is immediately experienced as idea of a self, 
or subject, mind, ego—call it as one will.” ® 

“Anything less than self-consciousness would not be conscious- 
ness at all; to be conscious is to be conscious of a conscious self.’’ * 

Miss Calkins’s thesis that “an adequate account of conscious- 
ness includes, with an analysis into structural elements, an account 
of the self as unique, persistent, and in relation to an environ- 
ment personal and impersonal,” ° is fully expounded and ably 
defended throughout her published writings. 

Criticism: Although Miss Calkins has appealed consistently 
to the facts of introspection in support of her systematic position 
regarding the self, almost all of the criticism encountered by the 
theory has been formulated upon the level of logic rather than 
upon the level of observation. A short bibliography of criticism 
of the position of the self-psychologist may be found in Moore’s 
Foundations of Psychology.® 

It has already been pointed out that Professor Titchener’s 
experimental study of self-consciousness’ does not establish the 
universality of the self-experience, the ubiquity or omnipresence 
of self. 

To discover whether or not an introspective study of the self- 

* Tbid. 

7M. W. Calkins. J. Phil. Psychol. Sct. Meth., 1908, 5, 14. 

* [bid., 1907, 4, 678. 

*“M. W. Calkins. Psychol. Rev., 1906, 13, 68. 

5M. W. Calkins. J. Phil. Psychol. Sct. Meth., 1908, 5, 122. 


J. S. Moore. Op. cit., 86. 
TE. B. Titchener. Op. cit., 540-552. 


12 ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN © 


experience would establish the other alleged characters of the 
self, namely its relative persistence, complexity, uniqueness, and 
relatedness to environment, was one of the main purposes of 
the present investigation. 

It will be evident from the experimental section of this dis- 
sertation, that the particular characters assigned by Miss Calkins 
to the self, are not the characteristics emphasized by the observers 
in this experiment, and are therefore not the aspects of the self- 
experience which are immediately observable, under experimental 
conditions. 

The characters of persistence, complexity, uniqueness and re- 
latedness to environment seem on the contrary to raise problems 
applicable to a partial consciousness, to the meaning aspect of an 
experience, from which the sensory or content aspects have been 
substantially abstracted. 

When both the meaning and the content aspects of conscious- 
ness are observed introspectively in the unity of a concrete event, 
and the description of experience is unhampered by convention- 
ality of report, an experience of self is reported, as in the follow- 
ing investigation, which bears resemblance both to the self of 
the sensationist, and to the self of the self-psychologist, but is 
different from either in that in this more comprehensive descrip- 
tion of experience neither sensory nor meaning aspects can occur 
independently of the other. 

In concluding this criticism of self-psychology, reference should 
be made to Miss Calkins’s careful summary’ of introspective 
report and experimental work which seems to her to support the 
conception of self adopted by the self-psychologist,—notably of 
the experimental study of recognition by Katzaroff, of voluntary 
choice by Michotte and Prim, and of volition by Ach, but it 
should be remembered, in any attempt to evaluate these studies 
as evidence for a particular theory of self, that each of the in- 
vestigations has for its primary objective, the description of a 
particular type of consciousness other than the consciousness of 
self. Reference is therefore made by the experimenter to an 


*M. W. Calkins. The Self in Scientific Psychology. Amer. J. Psychol., 1915, 
26, 495-524. 


AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY 13 


experience of self on the part of an observer of which no adequate 
description is attempted by either. 

A further bibliography of introspective report and experi- 
mentation, bearing upon self-psychology was prepared by Miss 
Calkins a year later.’ 


VAS ummary of Current Views of Self 


This brief review of the current theories of self should serve 
the purpose of showing that the greatest difficulty hitherto in 
dealing with the consciousness of self has been the failure to do 
introspective or observational justice to the total aspect of the 
experience investigated. 

The theory of self attributed to scientific psychology, and rep- 
resented by Professor Pillsbury, fails to account for the observ- 
able fact, experimentally established, that experience is some- 
times differentiated into patterns of self-consciousness, and is 
sometimes not so differentiated. 

The sensationalistic theory of the self emphasizes the sensory 
and imaginal aspects of the self-experience to the entire exclusion 
of the meaning aspect which is fundamental to this type of 
experience. 

The self-psychologist overemphasizes the meaning aspect of 
the self-experience to such an extent that the meaning aspect 
tends to be isolated from the concrete experience, and to assume 
the proportions of a concrete entity in itself. 

The following investigation of the experience of self was 
undertaken in the faith that an introspective study of this type 
of consciousness, which should emphasize full and free descrip- 
tion of the total experience included in self-consciousness, might 
resolve to some extent the inconsistences apparent in a survey 
of present opinion upon this perplexing problem. 


*M. W. Calkins. The Self in Recent Psychology. Psych. Bull., 1916, 13, 
20-27. 


EXPERIMENTAL 


The present investigation was undertaken with the purpose of 
discovering 

(1) whether there is an immediate, unanalyzable experience 
of self, in Miss Calkins’s sense of the term “ self,’ which is 
observable to introspection; if so, 

(2) what are the attributive terms which most accurately 
describe it, and 

(3) whether such consciousness of self is present in all ex- 
perience, or whether it accompanies one kind of experience to a 
greater extent than another. 

The problem involved was to provide, if possible, experimental 
conditions under which genuine “ self-experiences ’’ should occur 
to the observers in the laboratory and to obtain from the ob- 
servers, should they report such “ self-experiences,”’ a thorough 
introspective or observational account of the “ self-experience.” 
_ Four observers took part in the experiment, Mr. Louis Frazier 

and Mr. Hulin, both second-year graduate students in psychology 

at Harvard University, Miss Roxanna Murphy, a third-year 
graduate student in psychology at Radcliffe, and Dr. Roback, 
National Research Council Fellow at Harvard. Because of the 
nature of the problem to be investigated, and consequently of 
the necessity for precise introspective description, the results of 
the experimentation are based upon the observations of a small 
number of well trained observers, three of whom, however, had 
not been trained in the traditional, orthodox type of introspec- 
tive report, rather than upon observations of a larger group 
which would necessarily have included observers with less ex- 
perience in reporting. 


) 


Experiments, Group I 


A group of preliminary experiments was first undertaken, in 
which no explicit reference was made to “ the self ” in the direc- 
tions to observers. The experimenter sought to obtain first of 

14 


AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY 15 


all a thoroughly unbiased report from the observers, which 
should include at least some reference to the self, should such a 
phenomenon prove to be content of the consciousness introspected. 

The materials used in this preliminary experimentation were 
conventional designs of variegated colors constructed, like the 
nonsense syllable, in such a way as to exclude, so far as possible, 
all meaning associations, with the purpose of making the intro- 
spective analysis of consciousness, after presentation of the 
stimuli, as simple and direct as possible. Two designs oval in 
shape were mounted upon gray cardboard, and displayed simul- 
taneously to the observers by removing covers which exactly 
fitted the designs. 

The observers were then given the following directions. 

“T shall show you simultaneously two conventional designs, 
one of which I shall ask you to describe in detail after a second 
showing of the stimulus. Choose the design which you would 
like to have shown to you a second time, for the purpose of 
describing it. After an interval of time has been given for 
describing the figure, an introspection will be called for.” 

The observers were allowed to examine the designs until a 
choice was made between the two. The time occupied in effecting 
a choice was measured by counting the swings of a pendulum, 
and recorded by the experimenter. After O had indicated a 
choice, the stimulus was again exposed for a period of five 
seconds. 

After a few minutes spent in describing or reproducing the 
selected design, an introspective report was called for in accord- 
ance with the following directions. 


“Procedure for Introspection ”’ 


“Note: In these descriptions try to cover the entire range of 
consciousness called for even if in doing so you sacrifice the 
details of some one part. 

“1. Describe the consciousness involved in perception of the 
first exposure of the stimuli, with especial attention to all processes 
that accrue to the original core of visual sensations. 


16 ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


‘2. Describe as completely as possible your conscious experi- 
ence in choosing the design. 

‘3. Describe as completely as possible your conscious experi- 
ence from the moment of choice to the second showing of the 
stimulus. | 

‘““4. Describe as completely as possible your conscious experi- 
ence in attending to the chosen stimulus for the second time.” 

By calling for an introspection fractionated into four parts 
as described above, some report was expected of the nature of 
the self as revealed in (1) perception, (2) volition, (3) anticipa- 
tion, (4) attention and recognition. 

Because of the emphasis upon full introspection, the number 
of experiments completed within the laboratory hour differed 
to some extent with the individual observer. Observers F and H 
used the entire hour for completing one experiment, Observer M 
completed two experiments within the hour, and R sometimes 
three. Observer F gave two hours a week to the experimentation, 
the other observers one hour each. The introspective reports 
obtained from these preliminary 16 experiments (6 for Ob- 
server R, 5 for Observer M, 3 for Observer F, and 2 for Ob- 
server 1) are not included in the number of reports upon which 
the general results of this investigation are based, because it was 
obvious from later experimental reports that exact description 
of the sel f-experience depends upon direct observation and ex- 
plicit analysis of the self-experience, attentively observed, as such. 

Two results of this preliminary experimentation, however, 
deserve mention. ‘The first is the fact that three of the four 
observers make use in their introspective reports of verbal terms 
which seem more or less explicitly to imply a self. The second 
result, apparent only from later experimentation, is the fact that 
although an observer may make use of terminology which seems 
explicitly or implicitly to imply a self when the self-experience 
is not the immediate object of observation, the same observer 
may use quite different descriptive terms when the self-experi- 
ence 1s the immediate object of observation, and when the descrip- 
tion is therefore made as exact as possible. 


AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY 17 


The following examples are characteristic of the type of report 
obtained in the foregoing experiments. 


OBSERVER F 
Perception 
“After the exposure I was first conscious of a confused jumble of colors 
and figures. I restrained an impulse to just let the eye wander over the two 
forms, and caused my eyes to focus and remain fixed on small portions of the 
forms. I was conscious of effort in doing this. I then shifted my eyes 
rapidly back and forth from one form to the other, comparing them.” 
Volition 
oA The recollection of having previously selected the figure with 
crosses was followed by an impulse to select the figure with crosses. This 
impulse was temporarily inhibited by the thought that I mustn’t do the same 
thing every time, and an impulse to choose the other, but this was not suf- 
ficiently strong to permanently inhibit the first impulse. The instant of 
hesitation was characterized by kinaesthetic sensations of tension, and a 
feeling of unpleasantness.” 


Attention 
“While observing the figure, I was alert, with occasional sensations of 
strain. I was conscious of more than the ordinary amount of drive. My 
attitude was, ‘I must make up for this handicap.’ I was conscious that I 
was succeeding in giving closer attention than heretofore, and in grasping 
the essential parts of the figure more satisfactorily. The effort was pleas- 
antly toned.” 


Recogmtion and Attention 

“First, a feeling of familiarity. Then a complex of bodily sensations 
which meant, ‘I must make myself remember this figure; I must make 
myself observe and remember my experience.’ There was a very definite 
conative drive. There was also a feeling of helplessness manifested by an 
impulse to relax. There was an effort to discover some systematic arrange- 
ment, something meaningful about the figure. The attempt to fix the con- 
tours in mind was accompanied by eye-movement and bodily kinaesthesis. 
Color. memory was, I think, largely verbal. In memory, I can image the 
forms, contours, better than the colors.” 


OBSERVER -_M 
Volition 
“ Kinaesthetically, I vacillated—a sort of surging and ebbing directed 
towards one at a time and then ‘umgekehrt.’ I thought of the qualities 
(mentioned in 1) and of the possibilities for describing each. The affective 
value of the right-hand one was stronger and more definite.” 


Volttion 
“T chose from form-quality, definite meaning and affective quality. This 
latter was stronger in the case of the right- than in the case of the left-hand 


18 ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


one. The kinaesthetic sensations tensed and relaxed as I vacillated between 
them, inclining to tense when the right-hand one was regarded.” 


Anticipation 
“Visual imagery of both designs. Then will forcibly eliminated the left- 
hand one by paying attention to the right-hand one. Kinaesthetic strain.” 


Attention 

“T took the upper left-hand corner and by voci motor response, reeled off 
the names of the colors, visualizing them as colors, as I did so—then the 
tongue of green, the white—as a scroll—not visually imaged except as 
general image of what a scroll in general could be. Then I puzzled over the 
collarette and object to which it was attached. At last I took one flying 
glance at the cerise in the upper right-hand corner and got a formless sen- 
sation of cerise to add to the memory-image of the rest of the design. a 


Attention 

“Attention less strained. There was conscious attempt to define pattern 
of the four pillows. I counted number of dots in respective parts of design 
and (voci motor imagery) said ‘red,’ ‘red,’ accompanied by bobbing of head 
from above down—then shift to other side as described under (1). I shut 
my eyes to get visual imagery, then snapped back as I realized that time was 
going. Kinaesthetic tracing of design and localization of parts took place 
with right-hand.” 


OBSERVER R 
Volition 

“As usual, viewed both and decided that I was to make a better job this 
time. Both appeared more difficult, because they did not make a recognizable 
object, and so many details! I thought the right easier, because put it into a 
card-playing category, began to memorize the difficult things and said, 
‘right.’ Attitude of opposition interfered with the viewing of the left, for 
there was a retroactive inhibition. Knew that I couldn’t compass all the 
details, especially as the left design seemed detached in its parts. In all 
these experiments, I am always surprised how little I do remember after the 
perception.” 


Criticism: It was obvious to the experimenter, after reading 
these preliminary reports, that the experience provided under 
the conditions described above was too complex and extended 
over too long an interval of time for satisfactory introspection 
on the part of the observers. It was also obvious that such 
references as were made to an experience of self under these 
conditions were too general to be of real value in an experimental 
study of the self. Since, however, there appeared to be some 
evidence that an experience of self might be found under suitable 


AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY 19 


experimental conditions, and since the introspective reports upon 
the volitional aspect of experience, gave the best promise of 
further results, a second group of preliminary experiments was 
undertaken, with the purpose of discovering to what extent the 
observers might be self-conscious in a genuine experience of 
choice. A simple experience of recognition was also arranged 
under laboratory conditions to follow the experience of choice 
with the twofold purpose (1) of providing a further promising 
basis for a possible consciousness of self, and (2) of making the 
task of describing the essential features of a given experience 
less difficult, through the opportunity thus offered the observers 
of comparing or contrasting the given experience with another 
type of experience which should offer both points of resemblance 
and of difference. 


Experiments, Group Il 


In this group of experiments also, no specific question regard- 
ing the experience of self was asked of the observers, for the 
experimenter desired to obtain, if possible, a perfectly free and 
voluntary description of the self-experience, should it occur. The 
materials used throughout the second group of experiments were 
similar to those used in the first group. 

The directions given to the observers in the second group of 
preliminary experiments were as follows. 

“1. I shall show you simultaneously two conventional designs. 
Make a choice between the two (as free a choice as possible). 
Introspection: Describe as completely as possible your conscious 
experience in choosing the design. 

“2. I shall show you simultaneously two conventional designs. 
After a five seconds’ exposure of both, one of the two will be 
shown to you a second time. J/ntrospection: Describe as com- 
pletely as possible your conscious experience in recognizing the 
design. 

“3. What differences occurred introspectively between these 
two experiences of choice and of recognition? ” 

This group included 21 experiments (5 for Observer F, 2 for 


ZO . ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


Observer H, 7 for Observer R, and 7 for Observer M). This 
group of experiments has also been excluded from consideration, 
in the final results of the experimentation, for the same reason 
as was advanced in the case of the first group of preliminary 
experiments, namely that, inasmuch as the observers were not 
attending primarily to the experience of self, as such, the experi- 
ence is not described with sufficient exactness to be of value in 
an experimental study of the self. 

Criticism: The chief contribution of this group of experi- 
ments is the evidence, in somewhat more definite form than that 
derived from the first group of experiments, that three of the 
four observers are describing, however fragmentarily, some 
content that seems to involve self-reference. 


The following examples have been selected from the intro- 


spective reports, as indicating some degree or aspect of what 
may be called consciousness of self. 


OBSERVER F 


Difference Between Choice and Recognition 


“The difference seemed to be due to a difference in attitude. In making 
the choice, I was alert—bodily tension, heightened bodily tone; I was set 
to make a choice; I had a job to do. These things seemed to consist partially 
in patterns of tension, and partially in some X factor. In recognition, I was 
passively receptive, relaxed, not keyed up, perhaps less attentive. The 
experience in the first case seemed far richer and more complicated than 
in the second case. This may have been due in part to attitude and in part 
to the fact that the second experience (recognition) actually was more 
simple. The first was pleasantly toned; it was perhaps hardly a voluntary 
choice because it came with so little effort. The second was neutrally toned.” 


“Tn preparing for and making the choice, I had a feeling of being more 
active than in recognition. Eye-movement, voluntary alternation of atten- 
tion, the choice itself contributed to this feeling in the first case, and were 
largely lacking in the second, and yet I was not conscious of effort, as I had 
been in previous experiments.” 


“The choice was gradual, and issued out of a series of steps. The recogni- 
tion was, by comparison, immediate; it seemed inherent in the perception, 
and came, I think, at an early stage in the perception.” 


“The choice was definitely voluntary; it required more or less effort, 
although the effort was not focalized in consciousness as being important— 
the conative set, or whatever you may choose to call it, took care of that— 
but it was active and to some degree effortful.” 


AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY 21 


“The recognition, on the other hand, seemed to force itself on me; in fact 
its effect was like that of some sudden, unexpected stimulus.. A similar sort 
of conative set probably was responsible for this, too. But the effect, the 
experience in consciousness, was much like that of an involuntary reaction.” 


OBSERVER M 
Chotce 


“Finally I chose the left-hand one. It took some time to make up my 
mind. Eye-movements occurred during shift first to one, then to the other. 
Both were similar in color and general appearance. The left-hand gave 
more of a tension, the right one more organic sense of freedom and expan- 
sion, coupled with kinaesthesis in chest which gave tension and expansion 
for the respective designs. Finally choosing affectively, the tension became 
more pleasant. That design seemed more ‘characteristic. Hence, the 
choice. Throughout there was the sense of compulsion, of having to choose 
one of them. This caused strained attention.” 


Recognition 

“When the two designs were first shown, I characterized one as ‘ pink 
around edge,’ the other as ‘green in middle,’ by voci motor process. The 
visual sensations as to design and color, as well as the voci motor of char- 
acterization, appeared in interim following exposure. When the one design 
was again shown, I immediately responded with voci motor of ‘ pink around 
edge,’ and also with a fleeting visual image coupled with voci motor of 
‘green in middle’ of the other one.” 


Difference Between Choice and Recogmittion 


“The experience of choice required more strain of attention and in this 
case more kinaesthetic imagery. In that of recognition, the voci motor 
sufficed. Also, once the choice had been decided upon, I was free to forget 
the second design. In the recognition experiment, the visual images of both 
were recurrent in the experience. Visual sensations occurred in experience 
of choice; visual sensations plus imagery in experience of recognition.” 


OBSERVER R 
Choice 

“Very difficult to choose because conflicting factors kept interfering. 
Colors on the left more saturated, but more black ink there, too. Irregu- 
larity on left was interfering factor. Black specks on right tended to show 
careful work. Noticed that the black dots were at bottom of paper last 
time. Choosing itself very difficult. Simply couldn’t make up mind, because 
every time I started out to make final choice, something else turned up for 
consideration. The final choice was made voluntarily (injunction to one- 
self) because of consciousness that this was taking too long a time, and 
consequent embarrassment (thoughts, plus organic complexes, references 
to oneself, irritation with oneself, contrasting oneself with other people).’ 


22 


ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


Choice 


“Choice again very difficult, and what was less preferred before is now 
preferred as contrasted with new object. Irregularity of ‘right’ still notice- 
able, especially where line cuts or breaks a unitary figure but there was less 
black ink in this figure. In ‘left’ the irregularity, though not suggesting 
brokenness as in the ‘right’ was more indefinite and the ink with irregular 
crosses gave an untidy appearance. That was the deciding factor, when 
added to others. Choice is not carried out on single basis but involves 
several and it is almost arbitrary. Idea occurs, ‘I must put an end to this,’ 
due to consciousness of being slow—comparison of self with other people.” 


Choice 


“In this one, novelty was not so great, because I had a similar one before. 
Hence it was indifferent. Began again to single out differences, and noticed 
that intention was to make them pretty much alike. As I grew impatient, 
singled out a certain part which was better done than a corresponding part 
in the other design and summated it with another detail that I fancied in 
the same one and chose it. Choice here also self-imposed rather than 
spontaneous. The taking apart of details and noting differences and dis- 
tinctions, I call creative activity and find it pleasant.” 


Observer H throughout this group of experiments, as through- 


out the earlier group, describes experience in terms of process 
only. The following is a characteristic report of Observer H. 


OBSERVER H 


Choice 


“ Fore-period: From the verbal instructions, ‘To make as free a choice 
as possible . . . ,’ there was a general kinaesthetic relaxation, a passivity 
(to allow the stimulus to strike as it would); nevertheless, there was a 
medley of incipient tendencies of tiny yet overt auxiliary muscle extensions, 
as well as covert imageries of visual and aud-voc-mot types predominantly. 
Visual imageries principally consisted in memories, many-hued, and many- 
formed patterns (such as were in the former experiment). There were 
shifty eye-movements occurring whenever anything like a realistic design 
as of a landscape would develop, which would inhibit this tendency to see 
landscapes. (This latter was a negative Aufgabe of avoiding the determinant 
which had influenced the choosing in the past.) In aud-voc-mot imagery, 
there were the usual sets of ‘choose,’ ‘compare,’ etc.” 

“ Mid-period: With the presentation of the two stimuli, there was an 
immediate overt release of a fluctuation-wise response from one oval to the 
other. In an immediate total visual impression the left oval was composed 
of blue-greens and the right of red-yellows. The ocular fluctuations reverted 
more and more constantly upon the red-yellows in quite a purely tropistic 
manner (the eyes clung stickily to the reds and yellows).” 

“There was a sudden recognition of the right oval, which consisted of 
the following. In a sudden visual focussing upon three spots of orange 


AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY | 23 


in the left side of the right oval, there suddenly developed a visual memory- 
image of the ‘landscape’ chosen at a former sitting. This memory-image 
had the three spots upon the right-hand side and the incipient response of 
the visual memory-image so coincided with the motor response to the 
present visual excitation that the general motor strain now flowed out in a 
reénforced unitary burst. Great ease and exhilaration developed immedi- 
ately, even to an actual bit of laughter. There was an incipient exclamation 
of ‘Upside down!’ The memory-image of the formerly perceived ‘land- 
scape’ was somewhat successfully reversed with some oculo motor effort, 
and this imaginal response coincided still more with the present excita- 
tions. (The principal characteristic of the ‘recognition’ experience was the 
ease with which the present stimuli were incepted.)” 

“But from the contrariwise Aufgabe which had been set up, there was 
now a general tendency to revert to the other oval. In general there was 
quite a constant visual imagery scheme of a magazine cover. With this 
imaginal background there was some potentiality to observe the data, some 
bit of actual responsiveness to the data. In any other imaginal set which 
occurred (and whatever else that may have occurred was so fleeting that 
no memory has remained of it), there was only an increased mass of 
inhibitive strain, with this strain occupying the most of consciousness. (It 
seems that there simply had to be some sort of unified imaginal sieve through 
which the excitation could be directed if any intelligent response whatever 
was to be made to the data.) From the visual ‘magazine cover’ Aufgabe, 
there developed an ocular motor fixation attitude of taking in the two ovals 
respectively, simply as total surfaces (just as one might casually glance at 
a magazine cover as one passes by a news stand). In this attitude there 
was immediate conflict with the left oval, for here there was a conspicuous 
arch-shaped path which defied any effort to make a totality of the oval. 
Then in fluctuating back to the right oval, the general underlying motor 
surge of ‘choosing,’ of pouncing upon one or the other of the two ovals, 
now became completely overt, and as the right oval was easily perceived 
as a unified surface, the choice was consummated.” 


“After-period: Great bodily ease; an exhilarated leaning toward the right 
oval, both for the chromokinetic tropism and for the ‘magazine’ Aufgabe 
fulfilled.” 


Recognition 

“Upon exposure of the stimulus, there happened to be quite an immediate 
fixation upon a green leaf-shaped patch in the right oval. Immediately 
a visual image of the selfsame form developed. (The vividness of this 
imagery made it seem to be a memory-image.) And from this memory- 
image an expansion developed, including a whole oval of imagery (that of 
the ‘landscape’ formerly chosen). Particularly was the patch of three 
pink spots in the lower right-hand corner vivified by the memory imagery. 
There was again a great ease and facilitation in the coincidence of imaginal 
and excitatory oculo motor responses. This great ease also constituted 
‘ pleasantness.’” 


24 ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


“In the time during which the two ovals were observed, the left oval 
aroused only a blurred bewildering and inhibitory melee of visual imagery. 
There was not much more than inhibitory restraint—not even a unified sense- 
perception of the oval.” 


Difference Between Recognition and Choice 

“ Recognition, I think, is mostly the coincidence of imagery, especially 
very vivid memory-imagery, with the present excitation—particularly in 
terms coincident with the respective motor aspects of the responses. The 
recognition is especially vivid, perhaps, when both excitation and imagery 
are of the same sense modality. But even where a certain excitation arouses 
a univocal and uninhibited vocal response of naming—one name comes out 
vivid and alone—again recognition seems quite complete; but particularly 
if this sort of naming is added to coincidence of the duplication within one 
sense modality, as in vision in the present experiments. Choice is a sort of 
‘recognition’ between the present excitation set up and the basic Aufgabe; 
particularly in the blending of the two motor aspects.” 


These two groups of preliminary experiments, then, served the 
purpose of demonstrating that three of the four observers were 
conscious of themselves to some extent, in some sense. The 
problem before the experimenter at this point became the problem 
of finding out in what sense an observer was self-conscious—of 
obtaining as precise a description as possible of the experience 
of “ self,’ as it occurred under given experimental conditions. 


Experiments, Group III 


Accordingly, a series of experiments was undertaken, precisely 
similar to the second group of preliminary experiments, but with 
the addition of a final direct question regarding the nature of 
the self-experience. The directions to the observers, therefore, 
for this set of experiments, read as follows: 

“1. I shall show you simultaneously two conventional designs. 
Make a choice between the two (as free a choice as possible). 
Introspection: Describe as completely as possible your conscious 
experience in choosing the design. 

“2. I shall show you simultaneously two conventional designs. 
After a five seconds’ exposure of both, one of the two will be 
shown to you a second time. Introspection: Describe as com- 
pletely as possible your conscious experience in recognizing the 
design. 


AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY | 25 


“3. What differences occurred introspectively between these 
two experiences of choice and of recognition? 

“4. Were you conscious of yourself during these experiments ? 
(a) When? (b) Describe the experience.”’ 

This series included 37 experiments (11 for Observer F, 6 for 
Observer H, 10 for Observer M, and 10 for Observer R). 

Observer F reported a consciousness of self in 9 out of the 11 
experiments, the experience occurring 9 times under the condi- 
tions arranged for choice, and 4 times under the conditions for 
recognition. 

Observer H consistently reported, ‘‘ No experience of self.” 

Observer M reported a consciousness of self in 9 out of 10 
experiments, the experience occurring 8 times under the condi- 
tions for choice, and 4 times under the conditions for recognition. 

Observer R reported a consciousness of self in 2 out of 10 
experiments, twice under the conditions governing choice, and 
once under the conditions governing recognition. 

Inasmuch as the final results of this investigation of the ex- 
perience of self are based entirely upon data obtained in these 
and subsequent introspective reports, that section of the reports, 
which deals explicitly with the self-experience, namely, section 4 
of the directions given to observers, is illustrated rather fully for 
each observer, where circumstances permit. Other sections of 
the reports are quoted only where they contribute to a fuller 
understanding of section 4, inasmuch as only the explicit refer- 
ences to self, have been considered in this dissertation as evidence 
of the self-experience. 

The following reports are characteristic of the type of report 
obtained in this series of experiments. 


OBSERVER F 
December 13. Choice 


“T perceived that these designs were new and unfamiliar and similar. I 
then thought of the situation at the previous experiment, when I had judged 
the designs symmetrical. The question arose, ‘Are these, too, symmetrical ?’ 
This was followed by the judgment that. they probably were symmetrical 
and that consequently there was nothing to choose between them. I thought 
‘I may as well choose one as the other.’ At this stage, there was a mild 


26 


Self-expertence 


ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


feeling of expansiveness, as though I were enveloping both designs. Neither 
of them inspired any impulse to reject it. My selection of the left hand 
design seemed to come more or less as a matter of course, without much 
effort. I was conscious of the fact that I had selected L at the previous 
experiment, and that this was probably motivating my choice. But there 
was no conscious, ‘I chose L last time; therefore, I will do the same now. 
There was a momentary impulse to choose R—to do something dtfferent— 
but it was fleeting and quite ineffective.” 


“Tn choice I was conscious of myself in the sense of realizing that I had 
experienced a similar situation before and that I was reacting to it in a 
similar manner. And when I thought, ‘I may as well choose one as another,’ 
I thought of myself in the same sense that I had no preference and that 
my choice would have no consequences for myself.” 


December 18. Chotce 


“T attended to L for about 2 seconds, and then to R, perceiving almost at 
once that they were different; but the question then arose as to how they 
differed. I was set to find some point of difference that would give me a 
rational basis for selection. I turned again to L, my attention centering on 
a certain irregular oval; then to R, seeking a similar oval. This I found, 
but it was different, although in what way was not clear. I again turned to 
L and back to R. In this way I became aware that L was constructed of 
narrow lines, and R of heavy, wide lines or figures. The experience was 
pleasant. I was drawn toward the heavier design as soon as I perceived the 
nature of the difference. I looked again at L, but R seemed to get my 
attention. The decision consisted in this focussing of attention, plus incipient 
tensing of certain bodily muscles in such a way as to have moved me toward 
R if the tension had been stronger. It was accompanied by vague organic 
sensations which I didn’t notice until relaxation, after the decision had been 
made.” 


Self-expertence 


“In choice, I was at times conscious that J must make this selection; that 
there was an obligation on my part. This was not definitely formulated, but 
this feeling that J was responsible for getting this done came to me on two 
or three occasions.” 


December 20. Choice 


“Both seemed equally pleasant. I liked them both, and was conscious of 
the fact. I saw that there was no basis for choice which would issue directly 
out of pleasantness. So I said to myself, ‘Go to now! I'll make as purely 
voluntary a choice as I can, and see what happens.’ ” 

“T took a deep breath, and set myself to make a choice during the expira- 
tion. As nearly as I can get at it, the choice was preceded by a marked tens- 
ing of muscles, generally, and by a strained tension localized in the head. As 
the expiration began, this tension was such as to direct bodily impulses to the 


AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY 27 


nearer design. I can’t find any conscious choice other than the consciousness 
which attended upon the perception of the direction in which these incipient 
bodily impulses were turning. The particular form which the tension took 
meant to me that I was turning toward the nearer object in the sense of 
physical movement, and the perception of the direction of this incipient 
physical movement meant to me, under the particular Aufgabe, ‘This is my 
choice.’ ” 

“The tension continued and the movement increased until its meaning had 
been confirmed through persistence. The whole experience, although it 


involved effort, was pleasantly exhilarating.” 


' Self-experience 

“T was conscious of myself in setting the task to be done during the 
expiration of the breath. It was ‘I’ who was going to do the task.” 

“T was also conscious of myself early in the experiment when I realized 
that J liked both designs—that both were pleasant to ‘ me.’” 

“T do not recall having been conscious of myself at other times, although 
I have a feeling that I was somehow vaguely conscious of myself all during 
the act of choice—in the sense of self-effort—that it was ‘I’ who was making 
the choice, but the experience was not in any way clear, and if present at 
all it was on the very fringe of consciousness.” 


January 3. Choice 

“After looking at L and R alternately two or three times, I decided that I 
should have to make an arbitrary selection. I then made the selection very 
quickly. Just preceding the selection, my eyes were fixated upon R, but 
aside from this fact, I made the selection without any noticeable preceding 
movements or strain. I made the selection and was quite conscious of the 
fact that R was my choice—and then came something which felt very much 
like a sudden jump of blood pressure which merged into a momentary 
general bodily tension. But the decision itself seemed to consist in some sori 
of meaning that I can’t tie up with anything else—which made me aware of 
the fact that I was going to select R.” 


Self-experience 
“Tn choice, I was conscious of some sort of relationship existing between 
the task and myself. I felt that ‘I’ was a factor in the situation.” 


January 8. Choice 

“After glancing at L and R and perceiving their essential similarity, I 
looked steadily at R, seemingly fascinated by a certain triangle in the design 
which was darker than the rest of the figure. I was conscious that there 
was a similar heavy triangle in L, although differently located—and yet I 
continued to look at R. As I was doing this, in a state of unworried and 
irresponsible uncertainty, there gradually arose an attitude toward R, which, 
as it become more definite, resolved itself into the meaning, ‘ Well, I may as 
well select this one as any.’” 

“T could ‘feel it coming,’ gradually, without, in its early stages, being 


28 ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


certain that it would result in a definite decision. I was aware of no strain, 
tension, bodily movement of any kind, until the ‘meaning’ became vaguely 
subvocal, and even then there was nothing involved but a bit of barely per- 
ceptible movement at the back of my throat which seemed to help carry the 
meaning.” 


Self-experience 
“ Vaguely self-conscious in choice, as I became aware of the fact that I 
was making a decision—as being something that ‘I’ was doing—although 1t 
was quite unimportant—and made no difference to me.” 


January 15. Choice 

“Perceived first the similarity of the designs, and, with the thought that 
they might be identical, I recalled H’s remarks to me about the difficulty of 
making a selection between identical designs. This was attended by a bit of 
anxiety. Almost immediately, however, I noticed one striking point of 
difference—a certain part of the R design was larger than the corresponding 
part of L. My attention was fixed more on R than on L—(the meaning of 
the relationship was, not that L was smaller, but that R was larger).”’ 

“My thinking was in terms of R; I alternated between impulses to accept 
or reject R, and the necessity for positive action led to acceptance of R. The 
drive in back of the choice—the thing that turned a shade of attention or 
preference into an active choice—was, as usual, the desire to maintain my 
self-respect by avoiding undue hesitation and vacillation in making a 
decision. Without some such reinforcement of the Aufgabe (or is this all 
to be included as part of the Aufgabe?) a minor preference would not be so 
immediately effective in leading to a choice. I was set to make a decision, 
but this other ‘drive’ seemed to come with a running jump from behind-— 
it seemed different from the ‘set’ proper.” 


ieccgnition 
“Familiarity as a part of the perception. Later, the meaning, ‘Yes, I 
saw this before, under such and such circumstances, and I recall thinking so 
and so about it at the time.’ I wonder how much of this is necessary for real 
recognition.” 


Self-experience 
“Conscious of self, especially in the second part of the recognition experi- 
ment, although this was after the elementary form of recognition had already 
occurred; also in the so-called ‘drive’ mentioned in choice, although no idea 
of self was focal in consciousness. The feeling of responsibility, desire to 
maintain. self-respect, etc., involved self-reference.” 


January 22. Choice 
“Experienced pleasant surprise that the designs were so different from 
each other. The difference meant that it would be easy to choose. L was 
pleasant, relatively, from the beginning, and so, after noting the main char- 
acteristics of each, I selected L. The selection grew out of the judgment 


AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY 29 


that L was more pleasant than R. I was conscious all along that here was a 
criterion to which I could ascribe my choice. Even so, in the moment of 
choice, there was a slight tensing of muscles, especially of throat and chest. 
What this tensing meant at the time I do not know.” 


Recognition 


“T searched diligently for a noticeable point of difference between the two 
but without success. I was left in a somewhat confused condition which 
was a bit unpleasant. When L was shown, it was at once perceived as 
familiar, but I felt balked and dissatisfied because I did not know which of 
the two it was. There was a feeling of inadequacy and emptiness. I 
realized that I was unable completely to identify the design. I did not 
succeed, then, in really recognizing it.” 


Self-experience 


“A complex seems to have been formed about ‘self’! Although I am 
sure that there was self-reference and perhaps even consciousness of self 
during the experiments, I can’t now get at the experiences to describe them. 
Especially in recognition, I was acutely conscious of ‘my’ inability to recog- 
nize the design. I felt balked. There was certainly a kind of self-reference, 
but I can’t get at it.” 


February 12. Self-experience (Choice Experiment) 


“T approached the problem with the attitude, ‘I must make a choice,’ and 
I noticed, after glancing at the designs, that I definitely said these same 
words, sub-vocally. Accompanying the saying of the words there was a 
vague consciousness of general organic sensations, in which two heart beats 
seemingly stronger than usual, stood out. There was no particular tension; 
it was as though I were to think for an instant of my body. But there was 
something which meant. ‘I,’ beyond the sub-vocal saying of ‘I.’ It seemed 
to be something beyond the complex of organics, and yet not especially dif- 
ferent from it—much as a sensory image of some kind is related to a sen- 
sation. I am not able to decide for myself, however, whether it actually 
was anything more than a complex of organic sensations.” 


Self-experience (Recognition Expertinent) 


“This was even less clear-cut than the preceding. First, familiarity came, 
without any consciousness of self as far as I am aware; then, ‘ Yes, I saw 
that a moment ago,’ like a flash, disappearing almost immediately. There 
was no self-reference sufficiently definite for me to describe; it was there, I 
think, but only as a minor part of the meaning, ‘I saw that a moment ago.’ ” 


February 19. Self-experience (Choice Experiment) 


“This was a little more definite. All through my hesitation there was a 
vague consciousness of self, which once or twice popped out toward 
focality. Again it seemed to be basically, a unitary complex of organics, 
which helped, at least, to give the meaning, ‘I,’ The occasions when it 
‘became more clear were accompanied by more lively kinaesthetics and a 


30 ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


more definite consciousness of responsibility, of the relation of the task to 
myself. The ‘I’ did not stand out as distinct from the organics, and I 
cannot think of them as distinct. When analyzed, this particular conscious- 
ness gives mostly organics, and the ‘I’ almost fades out; but when taken 
as a whole, the consciousness means ‘I.’” 


Self-experience (Recognition Experiment) 

“ Recognition was incomplete, and led to questioning, ‘In which place 
did I see this before?’ ” 

“ Self-reference was pretty well swallowed up in the host of visual and 
kinaesthetic imagery with which I tried to identify the design. There was 
no self-reference which I can describe—the experience was too confused. 
As I look back, I can see that there must have been some self-reference 
but I can’t get at it.” 


OBSERVER M 
December 17. Choice 

“The left one was my choice. It seemed better distributed over the page 
and balanced. Such was my verbal-motor comment due to a feeling of 
kinaesthetic spread-out-ness, while the right-hand one seemed to cause intense 
kinaesthetic contraction, eyes fixed definitely at one point with a wrinkling 
oi brows attendant on it. Attention was passive so far as I was concerned; 
the design aroused the response all by itself.” 


Self-experience 
“Choice is more personal experience than recognition, because one’s own 
reactions cause the response. In the first showing of the stimuli in the 
recognition experiment, I was conscious of empathy akin to that first 
aroused by the two designs in choice, but in choice, my experience went 
further.” 


January 7. Choice 

“ Chose left due to feeling of expansion caused by the one detail that was 
different, versus kinaesthetic contraction. Looked at all of both designs. 
Read meaning of ‘box’ verbally into closed part and of ‘wings’ into more 
open one. Then chose on kinaesthetic terms as well as because of kinaesthetic 
visual sensations, which made figure more a part of the whole design. 
Aesthetic feeling of balance and continuity gave affective tone of more 
pleasantness in the one I chose.” 


Self-ex perience 
“Conscious of self very much in choice. I forced myself to examine 
minutely, and to seek associations, and an affective aspect in order to choose.” 


January 14. Choice 
“Attention exerted to determine what difference existed in the two designs 
which gave similar sensations, at first, from their color and general arrange- 


AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY 31 


ment. The resulting kinaesthesis was more outspread and calm, while in 
regard to the left-hand one I felt more tensed and concentrated.” 

“Therefore I chose the right-hand one, on account of resolution of 
kinaesthetic responses, intellectual appreciation of symmetrical arrangement 
and possibly the: feeling-tone of ‘more pleasureable than’ which accom- 
panied the perception of kinaesthetic responses.” 


Self-ex perience 
“Conscious of self in choice. I forced myself to take in any difference I 
might find by scrutinizing, and also to feel which was my choice.” 


January 14. Choice 
“Right chosen. No particular difference in designs except that the left 
one had a more prominent lower left-hand corner. This was kinaesthetically 
responded to after a long interval in which I minutely scrutinized all details 
of almost identical designs, and then responded verbally—being urged 
kinaesthetically to choose one and then the other—‘the right is aesthetically 
better balanced in respect to corner.’ ” 


Self-experience 
“Conscious of self in choice. I feel a kinaesthetic urge to go in one 
direction or another. <A little voice keeps saying, ‘ You’ve got to choose.’ 
In the recognition experiment, I let the designs be presented, taking account 
of only general features, as opposed to more critical attempt to distinguish 
distinctive features in choice.” 


- January 21. Choice 

“ Looking at both the designs, I saw that they were very similar, practically 
identical. Then on examining them more in detail, while obeying a kin- 
aesthetic urge that compelled me to choose one or the other, accompanied by 
a disturbed feeling of knowing task had to be done, I finally found a curve 
on left-hand one, while right-hand one had an angle. The curve was more 
aesthetic and did not give me the jump which the angle did. Chose the 
left-hand design.” 

“The Aufgabe presented itself as a disagreeable task, that had to be 
gone through with, and that suggested compulsion to make organism do it.” 


Self-experience 
“Conscious of self in choice as impulsion from within, causing a drive 
to do task, and as restlessness.” 


January 21. Choice 
“Chose right-hand one. Color more attractive, and aroused more kin- 
aesthetic response. No kinaesthetic response to left-hand one. I positively 
liked the curley-cue of the right and wriggled with it.” 
“Aesthetically, right one had more character, stood out, and attracted 
attention immediately. The other was passed over visually and forgotten.” 


32 ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


Recognition 

“Problem of open and closed box. Visual images of both designs, and 
especially of designs just seen in choice experiment, between exposures.” 

“Open box seen again. Response was to ‘open box’ carried verbally and 
looked for in particular part of design when it occurred.” 

“Since there was only one differentiating factor, this was only part of 
design that I took into account either at first showing of both, or of second 
showing of one.” 


Self-experience 
“ Conscious of self in pleasure aroused by choice. ‘I’ did the feeling. In 
recognition, ‘I’ did the comparing, the verbal response and the recognizing.” 
“The urge to choose was missing. Therefore self was not so deeply 
affected, but was more widely involved in the whole experience, both in 
choice and in recognition.” 


February 20. Choice 
“Chose left because of kinaesthetic jump, which the vertical lines, in the 
design gave me. The right-hand one had so much more of a quiescent 
effect, kinaesthetically smooth and easy going.” 
“Aufgabe: I was ready to react to one or the other.” 


Self-experience 
“ Conscious of self in choice as striving and as forcing myself to choose.” 


February 27. Choice 
“At first, these seemed the same as in a former experience of choice. 
Kinaesthetically, one was spread out, the other concentrated, but well bal- 
anced. Being told they were not the same, I looked further and discovered 
a cock-horse design in the right-hand one. Strained attention gave this, 
and the meaning thus arrived at decided my choice, because it added affec- 
tive pleasure and piquancy to the situation.” 


Sclf-experience 
“Conscious of self in choice, in trying to differentiate the two designs.” 


OpseRveR R 
January 22. Choice 

“Pleasant feeling came on exposure at the novelty. At first, the two 
designs looked alike. Then as task to choose became more vivid in con- 
sciousness, as the novelty wore off, the details began to be scanned for 
differences. The fact that the ‘right’ had only a touch of green in the 
windows—southeast corner, made it the more preferable. Then began to 
look for other differences, such as the quality and number of crosses, size 
of windows in upper corner. None of these differences appeared important 
enough to change decision. The decision in this case had been made, but 
was being held up for possible revision. Don’t feel as if I could make a 


AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY 33 


better choice by going over details again. Conscious simply of a tendency 
to fill in by taking different attitudes, such as interpreting figures, looking 
at one phase, stressing a particular side. There was a kind of idea which 
amounted to, ‘Why waste time like this? Choose or rather make your 
choice known and be done with it.’” 


Recogmtion 
“The recognition here was merely understood. I knew I had seen a like 
figure, but would not swear that it was the same. The recognition was due 
to the recall of an image.” 


Self-experience 
“Not conscious of self, except perhaps for questions such as, ‘ Did I see 
this before?’ or ‘Why waste time?’” 


February 12. Choice 

“ Choice here was very difficult. There was real conflict and I felt myself 

going from one to the other, discovering each time a new detail for con- 
sideration pro and con. Both about equally pleasant. ‘ Left’ had more clear- 
ness to its symmetry, balance, etc., but ‘right’ had more colors, yet at first 
didn’t suggest anything. It was here that I began to think about my indi- 
vidual traits, connecting this situation with others—proclivity for clearness, 
insistence on content. Just about the same time, the other design began to 
suggest something ‘springy,’ summer-like, gardens, flowers, and I was 
attracted to it. The other also began to take more definite shape. The 
corners were seen as heads of cattle in various positions. This still gave 
the advantage to the ‘right’ with its indefiniteness, yet pleasantness. Scanning 
the details, however, showed off the chocolate color as coarsely done, also 
the clumsiness of the ink line, and I thought again favorably of the left 
because of its workmanship. Alternated for a little while between one and 
the other, until strain was felt, just as if one had a burden on one’s mind. 
Finally the idea came up to relax the whole attitude and to choose the one 
which should present itself first in inclination to choose, since one could 
keep on going indefinitely from one to the other and then not know whether 
the choice is satisfactory.” 


Self-experience 
“ Self here mentioned in choice is of a recollection of situations, reading, 
reflections, comparisons with other people—a sort of condensed biography— 

nothing else.” 


The following report of Observer H is typical for this group 
of experiments. 


OssERVER H 
December 14. Choice 
“ Fore-period: Usual general motor attentional set. Auditory-vocal-motor 
‘blank design’ with visual concomitant of blurred vari-colored surface and 


34 


ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


vocal motor ‘not magazine cover’ with visual imagery of shifting surfaces 
along with more particular oculo motor strain of inhibiting a particularized 
visual imagery of a magazine cover. The effort to have just a generalized 
Aufgabe of ‘design’ consisted in keeping a kaleidoscopic shift to various 
colored surfaces.” 


Choice 


“Stimulus: Immediate blanket perception of two general wedge-shaped 
contours in each oval respectively. Colors similar. A constraint from quite 
an inhibitory balance between the two ovals occurred. The left wedge 
pointed to the right, and the right wedge pointed to the left. There was 
more emphatic response of attention then to the oculo motor kinaesthesis 
in following the two wedges—an effort to acquire great ease in following 
one or the other. As a not coincidental Aufgabe pattern seemed present 
to be coincided with, there was a debilitating and scattered variation of 
strains—again a mutual inhibition. Visual imagery (in retrospect) seems 
to have been quite lacking, except that in visual imagery, one of the ovals 
was turned around, and there was a schematic auditory, vocal imagery of 
“reversed-identical.” The ‘heightened tonicity from the inhibited situation 
burst forth in overt laughter. Then with some constraint, the left oval 
seemed to give an easier oculo motor response, probably from a reading-wise 
habit.” 

“The left oval was chosen. The ‘choosing’ Aufgabe of springing toward 
the picture burst through, upon the opportunity of the slightly easier oculo 
motor following of the left oval contour. The background of constraint 
consisted in lack of any coincidence of stimulus to fit any prepared Aufgabe, 
1.e., I could scarcely choose either oval as a design in terms of the habitual 
cues for balanced design.” 


Recogmtion 


“Aufgabe: ‘To recognize.’ ” 

“ Fore-period: Considerable oculo motor fidgeting concomitant with an 
array of visual imagery—nothing particular, as it so happened—just vari- 
colored oval patches.” 

“ Stimulus: The two stimuli were immediately labeled in auditory-vocal- 
motor terms—left oval, ‘arch’; right oval, ‘three spirals.’ General ease, 
almost lassitude was present.” 


Recognition 


“In a quite instantaneous reflexive way, the visual excitation of a red 
archway brought out the auditory-vocal-motor incipient exclamation, ‘arch.’ 
There was very little other responsiveness noticeable. No constraints were 
present, as an attitude of doubt. The thing simply seemed oversimple, 
habitual ! ” 


Difference Between Choice and Recognition 


“In choice, the Aufgabe is something definitely fixed upon and the per- 
ceptual material is reacted to in terms of it; whereas in recognition, the 


AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY 35 


Aufgabe is more one of passivity, so that the responsiveness will fit with 
the stimulus more immediately.” 


In answer to the question, were you conscious of yourself 
during these experiments, Observer H writes: 


“No ‘self’ consciousness was present. For the various strains and 
imageries do not seem at all to be bound up into any coordinated unity. 
True, there are infinite variations of inter-responsiveness between responses, 
but nothing of a unity or even of a continuous uniqueness of any thing 
running throughout the experiences. There simply seem to be multitudinous 
pushes and pulls in the efforts of various integrated sections against or with 
each other to issue dynamogenically into overt response.” 


Criticism: A study of the foregoing introspective reports 
contributes, in addition to the actual descriptive data submitted, 
two important facts regarding the so-called experience of self. 
The first is the fact that attitude or determination affects the 
results. When the attitude of the observer is to an appreciable 
extent one of responsiveness to the total situation, the self-experi- 
ence is reported more frequently and with a greater degree of 
assurance than when the attitude is one of responsiveness to 
details. When the attitude of the observer is keenly analytic, 
and when observation is focussed narrowly upon detailed aspects 
of the experience, as for example, details of the sensory content, 
the self-experience is either not reported at all, or is reported as 
vague and illusory. The most telling evidence in the foregoing 
reports for the importance of attitude or determination is to be 
found in the total inability of Observer H, the most thoroughly 
trained observer from the point of view of the orthodox intro- 
spective method of observation, to experience self except in terms 
of sensory content, and, secondly, in the change which takes place 
in the reports of Observer F, as observation is more critically 
directed upon the particular aspect of sensory content. I refer, 
in this connection, to the description of the self-experience as 
reported by Observer F for February 12th. 


“When analyzed, this particular consciousness gives mostly organics and 
the ‘I’ almost fades out; but when taken as a whole, the consciousness 
means ‘ J,’” 


36 ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


The second important fact, to which reference has been made, 
is the explicit or implicit inclusion of meaning as an essential 
factor in the pattern of experience described as experience of self. 

The scope of this thesis does not permit the elaboration and 
defense of a theory of meaning, and yet a clear understanding 
of the analysis of the above and subsequent reports demands at 
this point a brief statement in regard to meaning, as an empirical 
or experiential factor in the type of consciousness under 
consideration. 

In the first place, it is obvious from the reports of Observer F, 
that meaning is as characteristic a factor of the total experience 
under observation, as the so-called sensory content, and as such 
is entitled to consideration in any description of experience which 
aims essentially at completeness. The following examples are 
selected from the reports, already quoted, of Observer F, in order 
to emphasize the immediately experiential nature of the meaning 
aspect of consciousness, throughout this series of experiments. 


OBSERVER F 
December 20 

“The particular form which the tension took meant to me that I was 
turning toward the nearer object in the sense of physical movement, and the 
perception of the direction of this incipient physical movement meant to me 
under the particular Aufgabe—‘ This is my choice.’ The tension continued 
and the movement increased until its meaning had been confirmed through 
persistence.” 


January 3 
““T made the selection and was quite conscious of the fact that R was my 
choice—and then came something which felt very much like a sudden jump 
of blood pressure which merged into a momentary, general bodily tension. 
But the decision itself seemed to consist in some sort of a meaning that I 
can’t tie up with anything else; which made me aware of the fact that I was 
going to select R.” 


February 12 
“But there was something which meant ‘I,’ beyond the sub-vocal saying 
of ‘I. It seemed to be something beyond the complex of organics, and 
yet not especially different from it—much as a sensory image of some kind 
is related to a sensation. I am not able to decide for myself, however, 
whether it actually was anything more than a complex of organic sensa- 
tions.” 


2 a 2 ee ete - 


a? ~ 


e- 


Pr ea ae? 


AN EXPERIMENTAL SLUDY OMTHE SELEVIN. PSYCHOLOGY 5°37 


February 12 
“The ‘I’ did not stand out as distinct from the organics, and I cannot 
think of them as distinct. When analyzed, this particular consciousness 
gives mostly organics, and the ‘I’ almost fades out; but when taken as a 
whole the consciousness means ‘I.’” 


For Observer M, meaning and sensory content are so closely 
interwoven in experience, that the two aspects are seldom dis- 
criminated in the introspective reports. In other words, the 
functional or activity-aspect of consciousness is observationally 
for this observer of more importance in these experiments than 
the structural or content aspect, but function can obviously be 
described only in terms of meaning. The following examples 
are characteristic of Observer M’s failure to distinguish in 
analysis between the meaning and content aspects of experience. 


OsseRvER M 
January 7 
“Conscious of self very much in choice. I forced myself to examine 
minutely, and to seek associations, and an affective aspect in order to choose.” 


January 21 
“Conscious of self in choice as impulsion from within, causing a drive 
to do task, and as restlessness.” 


February 20 
“Conscious of self in choice as striving and as forcing myself to choose.” 
“ Conscious of self in choice, in trying to differentiate the two designs.” 


Observer R reports meanings in connection with the self- 
experience, though the distinction is not so explicitly formulated 
as with Observer F. 


OBSERVER R 
January 22 
“ Not conscious of self, except perhaps for questions such as, ‘ Did I see 
this before?’ or ‘ Why waste time?’” 


February 12 
“Self here mentioned in choice is of a recollection of situations, reading, 
reflections, comparisons with other people—a sort of condensed biography— 
nothing else.” 


38 ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


Observer H in an introspective report for March 13th, not 
belonging to this series, but quoted in this connection for the 
sake of clarity and completeness, writes as follows: 


OprsERVER H 


“Meanings to me are quite experiential—involving the degree to which 
some process started becomes resolved overtly. Sometimes we seem to 
have a meaning start of visual imagery or localization, then some other 
incipient response (imagery), probably latent in the Aufgabe, becomes 
stimulated associatively, and now commencing to become an overt response 
blocks the antecedent responsiveness. Thus meaning, as the first responsive- 
ness, becomes either inhibited or modified by filtering into this new aspect 
of responsiveness—and so on, until finally the whole original constraint, 
whatever it was, of the Aufgabe, set up by the stimulus, becomes overt. 
The degrees of becoming overt constitute a very experiential meaning.” 


The evidence is clear, that, regardless of the particular con- 
ception of meaning implied in these reports, 1.e., whether meaning 
is dealt with as idea, according to the terminology of Locke, and 
illustrated by the reports of Observers F and M, or as verbal 
response, or verbal imagery in the reports of Observer R, or as 
incipient or overt response in the making, as in Observer H’s 
report, meaning is acknowledged by all four observers to be an 
aspect of experience which is reportable, which 1s a part content 
of the consciousness under introspection, and which is therefore 
experiential. 

Furthermore, meaning and sensory content occur together in 
a total pattern throughout the experiences described above. 
Where both the meaning and the content aspects of experience 
are not differentiated, the meaning aspect is the more immediately 
observable aspect. Observer F, for example, during the first 
two months, covered by the experiments of this series, reports 
only the meaning aspect of the self-experience. Not until the 
introspective report dated February 12th, is there any description 
of the sensory aspect of the experience. Observer M, as has 
already been noted, does not in this series of experiments dis- 
criminate between the two aspects, but reports chiefly meanings. 

This position regarding the immediately observable aspect of 
meaning accords well with Professor Pillsbury’s discussion of 


AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY 39 


meaning.’ It should be made clear in concluding this brief state- 
ment in regard to meaning, that when we deal either with the 
meaning aspect of experience alone, or with the sensory aspect 
alone, we are dealing with abstractions convenient for the pur- 
poses of psychological analysis and no longer with experience 
as such. 

If, however, meaning can be shown to be an observable aspect 
of consciousness, scientific psychology has no longer any right 
to exclude meanings from the realm of psychology unless it is 
also ready to exclude sensations, for both are but classificatory 
terms logically constructed in order to deal with the experience 
of a functioning structure or organism sometimes from the point 
of view of function, meaning, and sometimes from the point of 
view of structure, sensory content. If it is true, as Professor 
Titchener has claimed, that “scientific description . . . is 
always an instrument of reconstruction,” so that “the reader of 
the observer’s report must be able to reconstitute, to reconstruct ”’ ? 
the experience described, then it is necessary that both meaning 
and content be included in an adequate description, since experi- 
ence undoubtedly occurs in unitary patterns presenting a meaning 
aspect to the observer immediately and upon analysis of details, 
a structured pattern. 

The actual descriptive data regarding the self-experience, as 
contained in this group of reports, will be tabulated in a later 
section, with the data from the three following series of 
experiments. 

Inasmuch as three of the observers were by this time some- 
what familiar with the essential features of the self-experience, 
the experimenter attempted to discover whether or not these 
observers could accept as descriptively true of their own ex- 
periences the following characterizations of the self-experience, 
quoted from published articles of Miss Calkins. 


*W. B. Pillsbury. Meaning and Image. Psychol. Rev., 1908, 15, 150-158. 


*E. B. Titchener. Description vs. Statement of Meaning. Amer. J. Psychol., 
1912, 23, 168. 


40 ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


1. “Not only mental imagery, but the consciousness of myself as ‘the same 
ego then as now’ is essential to recognition.”? 

2. “‘ Psychic facts belong to individuals.’ ” 

“‘A feeling is either mine or somebody else’s.’ 2 

3. “‘All genuine psychic processes, states, or functions of a subject, belong 
to an J.’’’8 

““We can not talk of experiencing without an I which experiences’ and 
which constitutes the ‘essential foundation’ of the experiences.”4 

4. “The fourth of these fundamental characters of the self is its related- 
mess. I think of myself not only as unique, but as related, not only as a this- 
not-another, but as a this-in-relation-with-another.’’§ 


The above quotations refer to the characters or properties of 
the self defined by Miss Calkins as persistence, uniqueness, the 
characteristic of being ‘‘ fundamental or basal to its experiences,” 
and the characteristic of being “ related to its environment.” 

All four observers emphatically reject the first quotation— 
Observer M, however, with the following reservation: ‘“ Does 
not seem to apply at all. If I thought it over, possibly I could 
force myself to see the application.” 

All four observers admit the truth of the second qualification, 
but all with some reservation that there need be “‘ no conscious- 
ness of the fact of self or of what it is” to quote again from 
the report of Observer M. 

Observers H and R reject the third proposition. Observers 
F’ and M express uncertainty. Observer F’s report expresses the 
uncertainty most clearly, and is as follows: 

“T cannot tell from these experiments. Many of the processes took place 
without consciousness of an ‘I’ to which they were related. And yet this 
fact does not eliminate the possibility that there may have been an ‘I’ with- 
out which the processes would not have been psychic. The fact remains, 


however, that processes did occur in which I was not aware of the inter- 
vention or participation of any ‘I.’ This is as far as I can go.” 


*M. W. Calkins. Psychology as Science of Self. J. Phil. Psychol. Sei. 
Meth., 1908, 5, 65. 

7M. W. Calkins. The Self in Scientific Psychology. Amer. J. Psychol., 
1915, 26, 496. 

® Ibid., 496. 

* Ibid., 496-497. 

°“M. W. Calkins. Psychology as Science of Self. J. Phil. Psychol. Sct. 
Meth., 1908, 5, 68. 


AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY 41 


The fourth characterization is rejected by all four observers, 
by Observers F, M, and R on the ground that the quotation 1s 
not descriptive of what is observationally present in a given 
experience of self. 


Experiments, Group 1V 


Inasmuch as the recognition experiments throughout seemed 
to have contributed comparatively little to this investigation of 
the self-experience, it was thought advisable to substitute for the 
recognition experiment a more active type of experience, and an 
attempt was correspondingly made to follow the choice experi- 
ment, as already outlined, by the solving of a problem, and to 
ask for a comparison of these two experiences with the hope of 
providing ultimately the best conditions possible for the ex- 
perience of self. 

Many of the problems used in the following experiments were 
selected from the National Intelligence Tests, the Stanford 
Achievement Tests, Advanced Forms A and B, the Thurstone 
Vocational Guidance Tests, the Terman Group Test of Mental 
Ability, and the Otis Group Intelligence Scale, Advanced A. 
Some problems were included from miscellaneous sources, because 
they seemed to the experimenter to be good problems for the 
particular purpose. 

The observer was asked in each case to solve the problem 
mentally after hearing it read by the experimenter and to give 
the answer orally to the experimenter who recorded the time 
spent in solving the problem, with the aid of a stop-watch. 

The time intervals recorded for the solution of the problems 
are not, however, reported in this dissertation for any observer 
in this or the later series of problem experiments for throughout 
this series of experiments, as throughout the earlier series deal- 
ing with choice and recognition, it was evident to the experi- 
menter that the time factor was in itself of little importance in 
the determination of the self-experience. 

This series comprised 16 experiments (2 for Observer F, 1 for 
Observer H, 9 for Observer M, 4 for Observer R). The follow- 


42 ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


ing examples are characteristic of the reports obtained from this 


series. 
OBSERVER F 
February 25. Choice 
“The self-reference was not clear, but it seemed to enter in as a part 

of the conflict at the instant of making the decision and immediately follow- 
ing. Both figures were pleasant and the decision was difficult. Even while 
carrying out my decision by pointing to L, I was conscious of leaning 
toward, ‘reaching out’ toward R, as though that were the figure I had 
rather have chosen. The self-reference entered vaguely into the effort of 
the decision and the regret which followed it. I cannot seem to describe it 
further than by telling the conditions under which it occurred. Effort, 
strain, hesitancy were present in the whole consciousness, and were bound 
up in some way with the self-reference, but in a way which I cannot now 
describe.” 


Problem 
“Tnability even to formulate the problem. Many instances of self- 
reference, bound up with struggling, bafflement, effort, etc. At times there 
seemed to be something which was I, and this something was struggling, 
trying to think clearly, etc. It was all bound up with sensations of various 
kinds, and yet it seemed quite real in itself. I was so confused by the 
problem, however, that I could not observe clearly.” 


Comparison of Choice with Problem 
“The self-reference in choice was merely a fleeting reference; that in 
the problem was persistent. But—I can’t get at them adequately. They 

are so confused with other things.” 


OxssERvVER M 
February 29. Choice 

“ Kinaesthesis on right-hand design was 7 ¢ ; on left-hand one —> «<—. 
It was hard to choose which one I preferred. cee kept referring back to first 
one and then the other. Finally kinaesthetic pleasure from left-hand one 
was more pleasant and so I chose that. The kinaesthesis was of calmer 
kind, besides being of sidewise type of motion. Verbal imagery occurred. 
‘Which shall I choose?’ Colors did not play any affective part; uniqueness 
of design made me favor the right-hand one for a while. Self-reference 
occurred in effort, consciously recognized, of having to choose, kinaesthetic 
tension presented to an active chooser.” 


Problem 
“ Self-reference when I reduced yards to feet. If it had been only yards 

in answer, the self-reference would not have occurred. Much verbal 
imagery, intellectual reasoning; little kinaesthesis or visual imagery. Self- 
reference occurred from presenting the kinaesthetic sensations of effort to a 


consciously acting individual.” 


AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY 43 


Compartson of Choice with Problem 
“There was self-reference with both. More kinaesthesis to be presented 
in first case and more urge, consciously felt, to bring it up. Pleasure of 
kinaesthesis was lacking in problem, also effort of choosing.” 


March 6. Choice 
“Right hand one appealed because meaning of dots on left hand one was 
“spotted plague,’ and this meaning created a kinaesthetic upset. Self-refer- 
ence, slightly, in getting the meaning and referring it to ‘me’ present in 
consciousness at that moment.” 


Problem 
“This involved self-reference in that the problem did not solve itself. 1 
had to do it. I got muddled, acquired headache, and the effort of trying 
made matters get more muddled, so it seemed. There was an emotional 
reaction of objecting to this tangle of logic. As soon as light seemed to 
dawn, I lost self-reference, then got plunged back into it and had to work 
harder.” 


Comparison of Choice with Problem 
“Emotion in problem, not in choice. Self existed simply as effort in 
choice, and in the problem to a greater extent. The meaning eliminated from 
choice further effort, and the usual conjuring up of self, but did not entirely 
leave consciousness of self out of the situation.” 


Inasmuch as Observer R reported no consciousness of self in 
the choice experiments, the reports quoted for this observer have 
been taken entirely from the introspective accounts of the problem 
experiments. 


OBSERVER R 
February 26. Problem 
“Imagery of brick. Faint recollection of school days. Thought that the 
problem is very easy. Process simple, yet took three steps—first subtracting 
1/2 brick, making it equivalent to 3 Ibs., then dividing 1-1/2 or 3/2 by 
1/2 and multiplying by 3.” 


Comparison of Choice with Problem Experience 
“Greater tension with problem at the very beginning. Choice arouses 
curiosity in fore-period, agreeableness attached to expectation. In problem, 
expectation is somewhat relieved by curiosity, but not marked by agreeable- 
ness. The burden in the latter is greater all through. The solving of the 
problem gives greater relief than the actual choice gives, for you know you 
are right. No reference to self, except for those fragmentary recollections.” 


February 26. Problem 
“Problem again brought recollections of school days. Instantly thought 
of proportion, and tried putting the figures together for the formula, but got 


44 ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


no satisfactory answer. Then began mind-wandering, with intermittent 
insistence of determining tendency. Had no self-reproach, because thought 
there is no use for such problems at this time. Slight amusement that I 
should not be able to do a problem of that sort.” 


February 26. Problem 

“ Difficulty of taking in all the data makes it unpleasant. Have to keep 
recalling the numbers or else am stuck for the next step. The problem 
excites some aversion as inconsequential. Detect at fringe of consciousness 
some attitude which means, ‘O let children do this.’ Meanwhile interesting 
thought comes up, ‘How I have changed.’ As a boy, took delight in mental 
arithmetic matches. Fleeting recollections of school days. All that inter- 
feres with the solution. Have to pick up again the threads, but find it easier 
now to collect myself. The process of multiplication and division requires 
moving of hands or at any rate kinaesthesis.” 

“The self again is represented by memories of differences in situations.” 


The report of Observer H upon the problem consciousness 1s 
reported in full. 


March 8. Choice 

“ Fore-period: In attentional set, oculo motor constraint predominant, 
moving in the habitual action patterns of ‘ good design.’ ” 

“ Stimulus: Eyes rested momentarily on left oval—constraint. No gross 
eye-movements occurred in the visual excitations set up. From the fluctu- 
ation-wise set, the eyes moved to the right oval. A huge oculo motor sweep 
from down left curving to upper right occurred with a considerable ease, 
which gave immediate, quite general relaxation. The fiuctuation-wise set 
asserted a responsiveness to the extent of one flash back to left oval but a 
gross bodily tendency had commenced in falling bodily upon the right oval 
and with another glance and easy eye sweep upon it, the visual motor excla- 
mation, ‘Right’ burst forth. The whole thing happened quite easily and 
freely—very automatically indeed—and had no more reference to some- 
thing behind the responsiveness really than a knee jerk response; hence no 
self reference.” 


Problem 

“ Fore-period: Usual attentional set with an ‘ultimate’ set to respond in 
auditory-vocal motor terms. . Yet ‘attention’ as usual is constituted mainly 
in visual images through which the vocal motor responses pass.” 

“ Stimulus: Vivid concrete visual images and quite automatic repetition 
of the question. When E presented the problem, there was a sub-vocal 
following of her words and this motor process was repeated. Visual imagery 
then became hazy and confused with some oculo motor constraint; and vocal 
motor response was intensified with an emphatic repetition of ‘ one-half, one- 
third, one-ninth of seventeen doesn’t make whole number of elephants—one- 
half, one-third, one-ninth are factors of eighteen.’ Concomitant sketchy 


AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY 45 


visual image of ‘1/2,’ ‘1/3,’ ‘1/9, ‘18’ involving something of a grey line 
‘number-form,’ not in any definite way, only as discrete efflorescences. The 
auditory-vocal motor response continued quite automatically with a general 
bodily ease—‘ these make—two—nine-eighteenths; nine eighteenths; (visual 
image of 3) six eighteenths—fifteen and (visual image of 1/9) nine into 
eighteen twice; two eighteenths—seventeen eighteenths.’ ” 

“In this calculation, some figures were immediately translated into visual 
imagery, were held thus, swiftly alternating with the auditory-vocal motor 
cues, and then exchanged. The figures ‘carried in the head’ were projected 
in visual imagery and the calculation process was quite an automatic verbal, 
vocal enfoldment. Thus ‘9,’ ‘6,’ carried visually in habitual oculo motor 
terms transformed in a flash into a visual ‘15,’ etc. Then in a sudden flow 
of speech: ‘one-half, one-third and one-ninth can be factors of eighteen 
without totaling (visual imagery of ‘17’) eighteen!” 

“Only these alternations and facilitations, like conditioned reflexes, 
between the incipient modes constituted the experience. No self-reference.” 


Comparison of Choice with Problem Experience 


“In solving problem, except for the set of an ultimate vocal motor 
response, no particular Aufgabe becomes set up. There is just a bewilder- 
ing interweaving of incipient responses (especially visual and auditory- 
vocal motor imagery) which flow together in a complex of conditioned 
response or else the one disintegrates and inhibits the other. But in all 
there is just a very ‘involuntary,’ deterministic filtering process which may 
terminate in a huge overt response, cleaning the organism of the constraints 
set up. Or there may be no real termination, but just a discomfited see-saw 
of constraints unfreed and this constraint may irradiate to a general inhibi- 
tive blocking, constituting ‘unpleasantness’ (so-called) throughout the body.” 

“In choice, the Aufgabe set, in this case of typified patterns of eye- 
movement for accepted ‘ good designs,’ is quite predominant, and the actual 
excitations set up by the stimulus are kinetically followed around in a some- 
what constrained manner (1.e., constrained by the kinaesthetic Aufgabe set, 
which is patterned in terms of quite gross movements), so that if a gross 
movement response occurs from the excitations from the stimulus, then a 
facilitation between this dynamogenic response and the Aufgabe strains 
causes a concerted outburst which is choice.” 

“In both cases a certain set of constraints (Aufgaben) are set up, and a 
filtering process occurs until these constraints become released—and the 
Aufgaben restraints thus dissipate away, usually to a great general relief. 
Both are mere releases of innumerable combinations, some impossible— 
i.e., inhibitive of progress, and some harmonious and facilitatory. No other 
background than the Aufgaben constraints—whatever chance happens to 
set up—are present as a self-reference. Often the Aufgaben have surprising 
complexities involved, not realized until the filtering process shows up some 
particular inhibition or facilitation.” 


46 ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


The descriptive data obtained from this group of reports, also, 
will be considered in a later section, together with the descriptive 
data obtained from the two following series of experiments. 

Criticism: Inasmuch as this set of experiments contributed a 
self-experience under the problem conditions exactly twice as 
many times as under the choice conditions, the ratio being 10: 5, 
as shown in the following summary, 


Self-experience in —- Self-experience in 

problem experiment — choice experiment 
Observer F Z 1 
Observer H 0 0 
Observer M 5 A 
Observer R ty 0 
10 5 


it seemed best to concentrate throughout the rest of the time 
available for experimentation, upon the analysis of the type of 
experience involved in the problem experiments. 


Experiments, Group V 


The following set of experiments accordingly deals entirely 
with the type of consciousness involved in the mental solution of 
a problem, the directions to the observers being simply to describe 
the consciousness involved in the solution of the problem with 

special reference to the self-experience, whenever it should occur. 
- The problems were read aloud to the observers by the experi- 
menter, and the time taken for solving the problem recorded as 
before. This series comprised 128 experiments (28 for Observer 
F, 11 for Observer H, 38 for Observer M, and 51 for Observer 
R), in which Observer F reports the self-experience 26 times, 
93 per cent.; Observer H, not at all; Observer M, 28 times, 74 
per cent.; and Observer R, 8 times, or 16 per cent. 

The following reports are typical for this series of experiments. 
As before, only that portion of the report which deals with the 


“aly EXPERIMENTAL STODY OF THE SELF IN. PSYCHOLOGY.’ 47 


self-experience or which can aid in interpreting the experience 
is quoted. 


OBSERVER F 
March 8. Problem | 

“After having made a hasty approximate calculation, there were two 
impulses, one to report the answer, qualifying it as ‘uncertain,’ and the 
other to repeat the calculation. Self-experience came in very vaguely here— 
in the question, ‘What will it mean to me, if I do this or that?’ It was a 
momentary hesitation and action involved a choice between alternatives. 
The meaning of each action appeared in the imaginal consequences of the 
action as referred to myself.” 

“The best experience of self-reference came when E did not acquiesce 
in my statement of the answer. I said, ‘I’m not right, then,’ and this was 
accompanied by a momentary sinking tendency, depressing, relaxing—which 
was followed by an increased tension. It all meant to me that a mistake 
had been made and that this mistake was referred to me; it was something 
which I had done. That was the meaning of the experience.” 


March 8. Problem 

“No reference to self until, after giving the answer, I wondered whether 
I was right. The reference was vague. It had to do with a slight ‘ feeling 
of uncertainty ’’ which was largely subjective. There were also organic and 
kinaesthetic sensations which were bound up with this ‘feeling of uncer- 
tainty ’ and which, in large measure at least, probably constituted it. There 
seemed to be something over and above the sensory complex, but I can't 
be at all sure of it. The ‘something’ seems to give meaning and direction 
to the sensory complex, rather than the reverse. That this is the case I 
cannot be at all sure, but that is the way it seemed to me during this 
cxperiment.” 


March 8. Problem ; 

“The principal self-reference came when I corrected my first answer. 
Something seemed to surge through my body (organics and kinaesthesis), 
calling attention to myself. The organics occurred, I believe, before the 
thought of self, and the latter seemed to issue out of the former—they were 
not distinct. It was as though these represented two stages, which were 
two ways of looking at the same thing. ‘These changes are occurring in 
my body, and then, ‘These changes are occurring in my body.’ ” 


March 10. Problem 

“Consciousness of self during part of the time I was trying to solve 
the problem, especially at first when I was experiencing difficulty in reducing 
% and % to a common denominator. There was the feeling that I must 
do this, and there was a momentarily imagined self-humiliation in case I 
should become confused. These references to self were accompanied by 
tension and heightened muscular tone which were supplementary to the 
strain accompanying mental effort. There were also organic sensations 


48 ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


a-plenty. And yet the reference to self was as if to something very real. 
The same sort of self-reference came, immediately following my answer 
in a momentary lack of confidence in what I had done.” 


March 10. Problem 

“ Repeated self-references, bound up intimately with organic sensations 
of various kinds. Often there was struggling and bafflement without any 
definite self-reference and at other times (less frequently) the struggling, 
the ‘ sinking,’ seemed to be in part activities of what I think of as myself. In 
these cases, it was pretty definitely ‘I’ who was experiencing the sinking 
feeling. The sinking feeling wasn’t just going on—it was my sinking feeling. 
That, at least, is the way observation gave it. Possibly it is just a matter 
of meaning, but I am not sure that I am in this case able to differentiate 
meaning from experience. I think one could interpret it either way one 
wished.” 


March 17. Problem ? 

“The chief self-reference followed immediately upon the reading of the 
problem. It came tied up with the thought, ‘I’m afraid I can’t do this 
under the circumstances’; there was a great deal of kinaesthesis and 
organics—a sinking feeling, followed by rebellion—‘ How can she expect 
me to remember my math. offhand,’ followed by, ‘And yet, I ought to be 
able to do it’ Self-reference was there, but it was all tied up with other 
meanings.” 


March 17. Problem 
“A feeling of elation, on being told my answer was correct, was definitely 
referred to myself. That feeling of ‘elation’ may be largely resolved into 
marked organic and kinaesthetic sensations, but the meaning of the whole 
experience was that this success was mine. What made it seem mine was 
probably that it followed effort and consisted partly of those most uniquely 
personal sensations—the organics.” 


March 17. Problem 

“ Self-reference when I reconsidered the problem after being told it was 
wrong—especially on discovering how foolish a mistake I had made. There 
were plenty of organics, but they seemed only to intensify the self-reference 
that was already there, 1.e., they welled up after I realized what a mistake 
I had made. I do not say that the self-reference occurred without organic 
sensations, but that the latter were not noticed until after the self-reference.” 

“The positive thing to note is that as the organics increased, so did the 
consciousness of self. The seeming absence of organics at first may be due 
to the contrast with the vivid experience a moment later.” 


March 24. Problem 


“In introspecting for this experiment, I have come to look first for 
organic and kinaesthetic sensations. They weve, in this case, present when- 


i i i i 


AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY 49 


ever I was conscious of self-reference. In a selective introspection of this 
kind, it is difficult to get at the whole truth, because one’ ‘introspects’ by 
looking for certain things in his experience. If he finds them, he describes’ 
them. If he lacks fertility, he doesn’t know what to look for. Conse- 
quently, I feel that most of my ‘introspections’ are quite incomplete. In 
the present case, I looked first for organic and kinaesthetic sensations and 
found them. They meant, for me, certain attitudes and impulses which 
were mine, in part at least because the sensations to which they gave rise 
are peculiarly personal. This description is inadequate, but it seemed. to 
constitute the most tangible part of my experience of self-reference. (Per- 
haps I don’t know what to look for.)” 


OBSERVER M 
March 12. Problem 

“A bit more self-reference than usual. It was ‘I’ who did the, figuring 
and regarded the answers and felt the effort of strain in attempting to get 
them correct. (Implicit. vocal imagery.) Kinaesthesis is responsible for 
strain. Strain gives feeling of integration. Integration is referred to a 
person—‘ me,’ who stands over and above the bundle of kinaesthetics. ‘Me’ 
and kinaesthesis in attention at same time give experience of self. Kin- 
aesthesis alone in consciousness is merely observable imagery.” 


March 14. Problem 
“ Self-reference came when I found my answer to be wrong and kin- 
aesthetic effort added to my troubles so that I referred the data to ‘ me.’ 
Scrutinizing it more carefully and making added effort, the ‘me’ did the 
work and both were in attention at once—‘ me’ including kinaesthesis and 


the work.” 


March 19. Problem 
“ Whenever I tried to hold cne answer in my mind in order to subtract 
it from another, then I was conscious of presenting the figures to ‘me’ to 
judge as to their being right or wrong. When the answer was wrong, 
the ‘me’ was puzzled. Then all seemed a blank and I began again with 
the figures as only figures verbally expressed—not related to ‘me.,’” 


March 21. Problem 

“ Self-reference occurred as something more than kinaesthetic sensations, 
when I made an added effort to do the work. The self-reference was not 
so much to an entity ‘me’ this time as it was a feeling of self being 
involved. If it had been the entity ‘me,’ it would have appeared as more 
actively engaged. Self-reference is of two sorts, one to an entity, the 
other to less than an entity. Kinaesthesis is at the basis of both. Con- 
sciousness of kinaesthesis gives the ‘less than entity’ reference; conscious- 
ness of this plus an activity on the part of something superkinaesthetic gives 
the real entity. When consciousness of self and the problem are in attention 
at the same time, then I feel the real self-reference or ‘ me.’” 


50 ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


March 21. Problem 
“ Self-reference in being puzzled and in recognizing the ‘me’ as being 
the puzzled one. This is in kinaesthetic terms, but self is above it.” 


OBSERVER R 
March 8. Problem 
“ Mistook bit for thread and lost most of the time wondering how many 
threads in a screw. Had visual imagery of bits and threads. Felt it was 
useless to go on, and the only reference to self was the recollection of 
comparison between myself and others, with judgment that I was inferior 
mechanically, but superior in other ways.” 


March 8. Problem 

“ Disagreeable feeling because of imposition of conditions. Necessity of 
having visual imagery, yet knowledge that the time was lapsing, and that 
imagery crowds out the quantity details made me think it was hopeless. 
Began to do the work nevertheless. Multiplied 50 by 100. Thought of 
the 5 but didn’t know what to do with it. Then imagery came up to assist, 
but was told to introspect.” 

“Self was characterized by very dim, marginal recollections of differences 
with others in mathematical problems, slight annoyance and, at the same 
time, satisfaction in compensation as to other abilities.” 


March 18. Problem 

“Did this in the ordinary way, but when divided 43 by 10, was surprised 
that there was a fraction remaining. I took the 4.3, however, added 3 cents 
and multiplied by 8. Surprised that the answer was not right. There is 
little urge in such consciousness of attacking the problem anew. I think 
there is a feeling (marginally) remaining over from school days that if I 
can’t work out my problem under my own conditions, I should not do it 
at all. The undercurrent is ‘Why not let me have paper and pencil and 
present the problem visually, if you want efficient work?’ This comment 
is in the form of an attitude, rather than in any verbal imagery. This 
attitude I can not analyze any further. During the working and interference, 
I sometimes think of other people who have different methods and am 
slightly conscious of judgments in criticism of their methods and work, 
though they may be considered highly efficient.” 


March 18. Problem 

“First step was to see how many hours elapsed. . . . Problem seemed 
more difficult at first because feared it was one of those problems involv- 
ing the change of places in hands of clock which I dread. General attitude 
on such problems, especially with the more difficult and uncommon ones is, 
‘Why bother with them, when they seldom come up in life, and if they did, 
you could get them done in a jiffy, by somebody who has a knack that way?’” 

“ Self at most a name for a bunch of condensed memories, cognitive, affec- 
tive and conative, including judgments, comparisons, etc., and set off, 
especially when thinking of other people.” 


AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY 51 


March 18. Problem 


“ Data, given too fast, disappear before they have time to be fixed. This 
causes groping about mentally and mind-wandering. Attitude becomes 
perfunctory and time is just filled in. Slight feeling of embarrassment on 
being told answer was wrong. Recollection of situations of oral examina- 
tion. Amusement with embarrassment. Self-reference in those recollections 
of the way I felt in school days.” 


March 25. Problem 


“ Perplexity at the difficulty of the problem. Recollections of high school 
and college mathematics, then reversion to task, almost by effort. Imagery 
of order, mud, water, etc. Had to visualize or else would not be able to do 
the problem. Then began to find common denominator, etc. Attitude was 
as in an examination of previous years, though the actual process of reason- 
ing was not attended by any tension. Satisfaction at getting through. 
Experience of self is here a verbal kaleidoscopic view of experience much 
condensed, a complex condensation involving images of others and memories 
of one’s past reactions, statements, etc.” 


March 26. Problem 

“Again recollections of school days (imagery). Thought of the rule of 3 
in proportion, but couldn’t think of the formula. Multiplied 15 by 6, but 
thought that would give more and I] wanted less. Fumbled about a bit. 
Just then had reference to self in the consciousness that others would find 
it easy to do. The reference to self comes out in recollected differences 
between classmates and myself, very pronounced in school and student days.” 

“Then reverted to the problem after thinking of the introspection involved. 
Just then the idea came, ‘Well, we do want fewer men; hence multiply 
15 by 6 and divide by 10.’ In all these examples, there is a feeling that 
the answer must be easy or rather that the working out must be simple 
and that governs the method.” 


March 25. Problem 

“Lost track of the 6 hens and thought only of 2 hens. Then thought :t 
was one of those geometrical progression problems. Began to do this, but 
saw that the result would be in the hundreds which did not appear true*to 
fact, though the premise was all right. Then simply began to add 2 eggs 
for each day and multiply by 6. The too great simplicity of the problem 
was unfavorable to getting the right approach. In mathematics, often 
approach the problem by what I expect.” 

“ Self-reference as in above, colored with slight self-reproach and offset 
by thought of compensations to be grateful for.” 


Only one of Observer H’s reports is included here, inasmuch 
as no one of this observer's reports contains a description of 
the self-experience. 


ne ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


OBSERVER H 
March 13. Problem 23 


“ Fore-period: Usual general motor constraint, oculo motor constraint 
and vague fleeting mass of visual awareness of unanalyzable components.” 

“ Mid-period: As E read, repeated the ‘words in vocal motor fashion 
with concomitant concrete visual imagery of street, houses, etc.; vocal 
motor ‘a square yard’—visual image of black square divided into thirds 
each way—vocal motor ‘nine feet—square feet ’—vocal motor ‘how many 
feet?’ ‘ Three—sixty "—(visual image of black square in nine sections kept 
fluctuating constantly with the vocal motor train of language). ‘ Three— 
sixty—nine into three sixty—four times ’—visual image of 3.60 which visu- 
ally was divided 9)3.60 and .40 stood out visually with immediate vocal 
motor response ‘forty cents per square yard!’ All of this followed through 
in a brief space of time and in quite an automatic fashion—the vocal motor 
imagery alternating smoothly, 1.e., with no inhibitive strains or confusions. 
But now as ‘forty cents’ was exclaimed again, caught visual image of the 
panorama of the street with a vocal motor incipient response of ‘fifty feet’ 
and ‘how much a foot for the width of each lot—of each side—of—of?’ 
Vocal motor kinaesthetic constraint arose concomitant with visual imagery 
of the front yards on each side and then of the pavement; with both, visual 
image of a ‘50’ in midair and ‘fifty’ in vocal motor terms, vocal motor 
image of ‘ fifty-each side.’ General constraint developed. The visual images 
moved more swiitly from pavement to the front yards. Frowns. Vocal 
motor exclamation of ‘Why!’ Spoke out, ‘I don’t know just what is 
meant!’ There was blocking of vocal motor images, each alternating with 
the other, and each going round and round, with increasing periods of blank- 
ness in vocal verbal imagery and grey blankness of visual imagery involving 
a huge, generalized kinaesthetic constraint, with a visual image of ‘my’ 
face frowning. All this constituted the experience of bewilderment, con- 
fusion and lack of comprehension of how to go further with the problem. 
These images, incipient vocalizations and general constraints constituted the 
entire experimental data—nothing unique like a self-reference seemed to be 
present.” 


The descriptive data here presented, as well as the data from the 
two preceding groups of experiments will be criticised in a later 
section, together with data from the final group of experiments. 

Criticism: The most important contribution of this group of 
experiments, aside from the descriptive data of the reports, is the 
increase in number of the self-experiences. The increased 
number of self-experiences occurring in the problem experiments 
seems attributable, judging from the introspective reports, not 
only to the comparatively greater difficulty involved in the task of 


solving a problem, but also in part to the social situation involved 


—_— ai 


— 





AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY 53 


for the observer in reporting the answer to the experimenter for 
a decision of accuracy or inaccuracy. A careful study of the 
introspective reports of the observers indicates that for Observer 
F, 54 per cent. of the self-experiences arising out of the problem 
experiments occurred not during the actual solution of the prob- 
lem but immediately before or after giving the answer to the 
experimenter, or during the process of submitting an answer. 
The same is true for Observer M, in 21 per cent. of the self- 
experiences of this series. How far the social situation may be 
effective during the entire process of obtaining the answer, it is 
difficult to determine. 

Inasmuch as Observers F, M, and R, were by this time quite 
familiar with the observational details of the self-experience, the 
experimenter asked from each of these observers a further 
descriptive report of the self in terms which should render as 
unmistakable as possible the interpretation to be laid upon the 
experiences of self, already set forth in the individual reports. 

These generalized descriptions of the self-experience are quoted 
in full for each observer, because they are of great value in the 
interpretation of the descriptive data contained in the individual 
reports. 


The descriptions are as follows: 


OBSERVER F 


“T can not tell whether what I have been referring to as ‘I’ is really 
something which is directly experienced or whether it is meaning. Usually 
it appears to be the latter. It usually comes as one aspect of a complicated 
consciousness, so bound up with a great mass of sensory content that it is 
impossible adequately to distinguish between them.” 

“When I say that such and such an experience involves self-reference, I 
mean that the experience carries the meaning of being uniquely personal— 
of being not the experience of Tom Smith, but of the individual who I am. 
There is nothing striking about this. I think no one seriously denies it.” 

“ But when I speak of ‘ myself’ as seeming to do certain things—of strug- 
gling, etc.—the case is somewhat different. Surely, taken on one level, one 
would say, ‘Here is an entity of some kind, something unique and real and 
active. So says common sense. In the light of my experience with this 
experiment, however, it seems far more probable that what I have denoted 
as ‘I’ is not a ‘self,’ but a consciousness of ‘selfness ’—perhaps a concept to 


54 ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


which certain experience is related—in other words, that ‘I’ is the meaning 
which has come to be attached to certain experiential processes.” 

“ But this is guess work. I think that I experience self-reference and self- 
activity and, taken on an ‘uncritical, unanalytical level, I certainly do; but 
the explanation of self as meaning is so reasonable that one has a tendency 
to consider the first as mere naiveté. It is for E to decide which way she 
wishes to look at the matter! ” 


OBSERVER M 


“ Self-reference to me consists in consciously bringing one’s self into 
relation with the problem in question by bringing the two, problem and self, 
into attention at the same time. It consists of a definite effort in kinaesthetic 
terms with ‘me’ over and above all sensations; and gives a feeling to the 
observer of taking active interest in problem, which interest does not exist 
in passive attitude where ideas are not stirred up for a purpose and reviewed 
and discarded with that purpose in mind.” 

““™Me’ is possibly a fusion of a certain bundle of qualitative and quanti- 
tative kinaesthetic sensations, consciously attended to as integration.” 

““ Me’ is observational when I experience it as existing.” 


OBSERVER R 


“Highest manifestation of reference to self, is the condensation of 
memories, judgments, complexes and mirror reflections, all occurring 
through different situations, unified under a verbal image—and especially of 
the differences which struck me as between this super complex and others, 
the accumulation of these differences. The self is a meaning carried in the 
verbal image, ‘I,’ ‘me,’ ‘my,’ and referring to all the foregoing. This 
meaning is more vivid in accordance with the greater or less intensity of the 
memory-complex, which in its turn is favored by emotional situations. I 
may have a bodily feel included with the other elements, but don’t regard it 
as substantially necessary. While all the other elements are unified as a 
result of accumulation, the bodily feel varies so and is so devoid of meaning, 
that there is no possibility of permanent reference. The meaning involved 
here is mediated or marked by the imaginal kind of experience, not the 
sensory.” 


Observer H, having found nothing under the given experi- 
mental conditions, which he can characterize as an experience of 
self, submits the following statement of ‘what in my experience 
compares, I suspect, with the experiences in others which they call 
a self-reference.” The report was written at the close of the 
experiment in which a solution of the following problem was 
called for. “If a brick weighs 3 lbs. and 14 a brick, what will a 
brick and a half weigh ?” 


AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY Ud 


OssEeRVER H 


“The vortices of experiential ‘Teilinhalte’ precipitate into quite definite 
absolutes at various pattern levels—that is, a concrete visual image of a 
brick may stand as quite a structural unit at one level, and a vocal motor 
chain reflex of verbal phraseology, such as, ‘three pounds and half a brick’ 
may likewise function as a unit. Thus these units in temporal sequence 
make up the hop-skip-and-jump succession of experience. In the partial, 
not complete, unitariness of consciousness, one after the other of these 
modes of response becomes pro-tem the dynamogenic outlet. For ‘me’ 
(grammatically) there exists only this series of responsivenesses, one after 
the other. Sometimes one response breaks through in the midst of some 
other, either to the facilitation or inhibition of the other or inhibition of 
both. For example, as the vocal motor response, ‘Three pounds and half a 
brick’ progressed so far, suddenly a visual image of a red brick broken in 
half became predominant, and integral with this shift there was a heightened 
tension and adjustment in the ocular motor set with a sudden inhibitory 
laryngeal breathlessness, occurring in connection with the vocal motor 
incipient response. Then the vocal motor responsiveness just happened not 
to be checked, but moved onward in a sort of chain reflex fashion— half a 
brick, three pounds, whole brick, six pounds!’ ” 

“Thus one responsive set after another is touched off with all sorts of 
varying integrations occurring as the whole general Aufgabe, or gross, 
dominant responsive set, filters through the maze toward complete overt 
behavior.” 

“Now all there seems to be is just a kaleidoscopic series of blends and 
conflicts between a hugely various congregation of responsive sets. These 
responsive sets (the consciousness and the objective observableness being, 
perhaps, just the double aspect of internal and external relations, respectively ) 
simply follow one another, or occur severally, for there seems to ‘me’ 
(grammatical) to be the possibility of several little consciousnesses simul- 
taneously! This sequence also seems, just as a marble rolling through a 
maze, to follow a deterministic trial-and-error method, with the final goal 
constituted only of such completion of responsiveness between confluent 
responses, that they simply all become dissipated, with no inhibitory con- 
straints or blocked-up responses still straining for overt expression. Just 
this storing of responsiveness constitutes the whole of experience. No 
reference to a unique or unanalyzable self has been observable at all.” 

“ Certain situations, however, may seem more ‘selfish.’ For example, two 
major responses may block each other. A visual image may occur to which 
there comes no verbal counterpart. Then the reflexive outgoing of energy 
irradiates into a general somatic constraint. Frequently here the path of 
least resistance is an habitual one, very frequently a gestural and vocal 
motor language habit, such as shaking the head, scowling, and exclaiming 
incipiently, ‘ No, that’s not right!’ ‘ Now, let’s. see!’”’ 

“Frequently, also, there occurs a visual image of the soma’s own face, 
involving all the psychosis of one’s having to stand before the gaze of one’s 


56 ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


fellows. Thus really, there seems to be an illusion of a unique entity, a sort 
of ghost within.” 


Criticism: The reports of Observers F, M, and R, show 
essential agreement in the analysis of the self-experience, as 
fundamentally a meaning experience. 

Observer F’s report raises the question of the existentiality of 
meaning. 

“T can not tell whether what I have been referring to as ‘I’ is really 

something which is directly experienced or whether it is meaning. 

I think that I experience self-reference and self-activity, and taken on an 

uncritical, unanalytic level, I certainly do, but the explanation of self as 

meaning is so reasonable that one has a tendency to consider the first as 


mere naiveté. It is for E to decide which way she wishes to look at the 
matter.” 


if, however, we admit the obvious fact that meaning is present 
in consciousness and is reportable, is not the real problem at issue, 
not the question of the existentiality of meaning, but the question 
whether the acknowledged existentiality of meaning is of the same 
order as the existentiality of sensory content? ‘The introspective 
reports of Observers F, M, and R, clearly show that when any 
experience of an organism or functioning structure is described 
with reference to its functioning aspect, meaning terminology is 
applicable and necessary. It is the necessity for consideration of 
this functioning aspect, if one is to deal adequately with experi- 
ence, which seems to create a problem, inasmuch as the descriptive 
terminology applicable to the content aspect of experience is 
inadequate to a full description of the functioning aspect. 

Since, therefore, the experimenter is called upon by Observer F 
to decide “which way she wishes to look at the matter,” the 
experimenter in view of all the data collected in the course of this 
experimentation, decides that concrete experience, which is the 
only really observable experience, is always an integration of 
meaning with sensory content, and that this integration is exist- 
ential. The term integration throughout this dissertation refers 
to that type of unification or organization of experience which 
may best be described as organic, and which is in varying degrees 


AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY 57 


the distinguishing characteristic of all organisms, or functioning 
structures. The expression ‘‘organic unity’ would be synony- 
amous with integration as here used. 

The existentiality of meaning apart from sensory content, or 
of sensory content apart from meaning may with equal validity 
be called into question, since, as was pointed out in an earlier 
section of this investigation, both meaning and sensation are 
logical abstractions from experience, and are serviceable merely 
as classificatory terms, whenever for scientific purposes it is con- 
venient to separate the functional or activity aspect from the 
content aspect of experience, in which, however, these two aspects 
really constitute an organic whole. If the experimenter’s argu- 
ment regarding the existentiality of meaning be accepted, Observer 
M’s report of the self-experience is in entire accord with that of 
Observer F. 

On March 19th, Observer M wrote in criticism of Observer F’s 
description of the self-experience, 


“T agree with the statement of the first paragraph, but can distinguish 
more than Observer F does. The experience seems more experiential to 
me but may be a vague meaning.” 

“The second paragraph is true—very personal note and my own unique 
experience.” 

“The third paragraph expresses a new idea but I expressed it in part 
when I said, ‘holding problem and me’ in consciousness at same time. This 
refers to ‘me’ as consciousness of self and less than an entity, ‘me’ ‘as 
meaning attached to certain experiential processes.” 

“JT agree with the last paragraph, but I experience self-reference and 
self working on problems, even if it is to consider the problem in a naive 
way. At present it seems so, but the self-experience may of course really 
consist of meaning.” 


The chief difference between the reports of Observers F and M 
and that of Observer R lies in the fact that for this last observer 
the meaning aspect of the self-experience is integrated with the 
imaginal type of experience, rather than with the sensory type, as 
in the case of the first two observers. This difference, however, 
is of but secondary importance and will be referred to again in 
the section dealing primarily with the descriptive data of the 
reports. 


58 ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


Observer H’s failure to report meanings, must be due either to 
the fact that they are entirely absent from his experience, or to 
this observer’s conviction that meanings are not existential and so 
do not belong to the realm of psychological report. There are, 
however, even in this observer’s reports, occasional references to 
meaning, as that contained in the last sentence of the following 
quotation from a report of March 13th. 

“There was blocking of vocal motor images, each alternating with the 
other, and each going round and round, with increasing periods of blankness 
in vocal verbal imagery and grey blankness of visual imagery involving a 
huge, generalized kinaesthetic constraint, with a visual image of ‘my’ face 


frowning. All this constituted the experience of bewilderment, confusion 
and lack of comprehension of how to go further with the problem.” 


A still better example is to be found in the report last quoted. 


“Frequently also there occurs a visual image of the soma’s own face, 
involving all the psychosis of one’s having to stand before the gaze of one’s 
fellows. Thus really, there seems to be an illusion of a unique entity, a sort 
of ghost within.” 


The obvious conclusion to be drawn here is, therefore, that 
Observer H has neglected to report meanings, not that they do not 
occur in his experience. 

The importance attributed to meaning in the self-configuration 
or consciousness will be referred to again in that section of the 
dissertation which deals primarily with the descriptive data con- 
tained in the introspective reports. 


Experiments, Group VI 


A final group of experiments was undertaken, in which the 
experimental conditions were precisely the same as for the pre- 
ceding set of experiments, with the single exception that an 
experimental hour was arranged when all four observers could be 
present, and the problems were now read aloud to the group 
instead of being dictated individually. The observer first obtain- 
ing a solution of the problem was asked to give the answer orally, 
and time was then given to all the observers for introspection. 

The group experiment was undertaken with the purpose of 


AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY 59 


discovering whether or not the presence of the other observers, 
with the competition thus introduced, would intensify’ or in any 
other way affect the nature and occurrence of the self-experience. 

This final series included 80 experiments, 20 for each observer, 
in which Observers F and M reported a self-experience in 17 
experiments, or 85 per cent. of the total number of the series, and 
Obserbers H and R reported no such experiences. 

Throughout the first half of the series, the introspection was 
taken as soon as the correct answer had been obtained by any 
one of the four observers. In the second half of the series, each 
observer was asked to work out a complete solution of the prob- 
lem, before beginning the introspective report. The answers 
were therefore not given orally in the later experiments. The 
observers throughout this series were asked to report only upon 
the experience of self. Ten problems were dictated during an 
experimental hour, and consequently the introspective reports are 
less complete than the earlier reports. 

The following reports of Observers F and M have been 
selected as being representative for this series. 


OBSERVER F 
March 27. Problem 


“Self-reference when I gave my answer and especially when E said it 
was not correct. The former situation involved hesitancy and was accom- 
panied by several incipient tendencies to speak. The latter involved a 
tendency to withdraw and a feeling of self-consciousness and embarrass- 
ment—flushing, peculiar organics predominantly.” 


March 27. Problem 
“ Self-reference just before I said, ‘5 per cent.’ and while saying it, a 
curious inhibition in the thorax—a temporary interruption of breathing which 
drew attention to myself, and constituted, I think, the core of the self- 
reference.” 


March 27. Problem 
“Slight embarrassed hesitancy immediately preceding my saying, ‘ Forty- 
four.’ It involved restriction in breathing, momentary tension of a different 
kind from that involved in solving the problem, and a very vague memorial 
reéxperience of embarrassment on previous occasion when [ had been 
wrong. This all gave self-reference.” s 


60 ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


March £7. Problem 
“While E was re-reading the problem, there was a sort of self-reference. 
It was involved in the thought that I was on the right track and would almost 
have solved it by the time E was through. There was an anticipatory bodily 
expansiveness, an actual, incipient ‘spreading out’ which I referred to the 
immediate future and which was identified as mine, and as meaning that I 
was going to feel that way.” 


April 1. Problem 
“ Several self-references, difficult now to identify, principally when I had 
given half the answer and E said to wait until I had it all. The experience 
was one of slight embarrassment coupled with assurance. These meanings 
were carried in part by somatic patterns which drew attention to myself and 
helped to constitute the self-reference.” 


OBSERVER M 
March 27. Problem 
“Verbal response. Conscious of self during problem, not as active agent, 
but merely as being existent and in attendance. Self did not do problem— 
it did itself.” 


March 27. Problem 
“ Self-reference, for ‘me’ did adding and was conscious of it, was active 
agent.” 


March 27. Problem 
““Me’ did the work. Self-reference in keeping visual imagery of problem 
in my mind. When problems get harder, consciousness of self always comes, 
then actual reference to self as entity, agent of strained attention and 
activity.” 


March 27. Problem 
“ Self-conscious in being attentive and in presenting verbal imagery to 
someone. It was presented to my consciousness of self. ‘Me,’ the entity, 

was not involved.” 


April 1. Problem 
“ Self-reference in dividing up the number of books. It was ‘me’ who 
actively divided them up and was conscious of the results being personally 
realized.” : 


Criticism: The reports obtained from this series indicate that 
for Observer F, the number of self-experiences is slightly 
diminished as a result of the presence of the group, showing a 
drop from 85 per cent. to 73 per cent., but the intensity of the 
experiences, according to the observer’s own report, is somewhat 


AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY 61 


increased. The apparent decrease in number may however be 
due simply to the increased difficulty of introspection under the 
group conditions, as indicated by the following report of 
Observer F upon the differences observable between the group 
experience and the individual experience in solving problems. 


OBSERVER F 

“The differences are, 

“1. Slightly increased embarrassment on being wrong, in the presence of 
the group. 

“2. Greater difficulty in group experiment, in observing my experience, 
and considerably greater difficulty in reporting, 7.e., in introspecting ade- 
quately. I felt hurried—as though I were slighting the experience. 

“3. I have a feeling that I did get better self-references in the group 
experiments, but that the difficulty of observing calmly and of introspecting 
adequately counteracts the frequency and intensity of the self-references.” 


The reports of Observer M show an increase of 13 per cent. 
in the number of self-experiences obtained in the group experi- 
ments over the number obtained in the individual experiments. 
This observer’s report of the difference between the two methods 
of solving problems substantiates this conclusion. 


OBSERVER M 


“More kinaesthetic strain required to maintain attentive set in the group 
experiments, which involved self-reference more frequently as a conse- 
quence, since self-reference involves kinaesthesis to a greater or less degree. 
Consciousness of self is built up on kinaesthesis but is more also.” 


The failure of Observer R to report a self-experience in the 
group experiments is difficult to understand, inasmuch as the 
nature of the experience described in the reports seems identical 
with the type of experience characterized in the earlier reports 
as a self-experience. The following reports will serve to illustrate 
the point. 


OBSERVER R 
March 27. Problem 
“Just had the first two numbers fixed. Groped about to see what’s to be 
done. The fact that there were others in the room who could do the problem 
in a jiffy was a source of inhibition. Attitude: What’s the use? Before I 
take the first step, it will be done.” 


62 ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


March 27. Problem 
“This seemed easy, but too many fractions to carry in mind, and easy to 
make a mistake accordingly. . . . No self-reference, though when I 
thought of others not getting it, I hoped I would get it.” 


April 1. Problem 
“Didn’t remember all the data. Slightly annoyed in the verbal form: 
‘Why don’t we get the data before us?’ More of an inhibition against 
asking again, when the others are about. Wonder how they could retain the 
details.” 


Observer R points out the following differences between the 
individual experiments in solving problems and the group experi- 
ments. 

“Firstly, the task is less burdensome; the atmosphere more cheerful which 
is a help. In my own case, there is inhibition because I know that the others 


will get the answer sooner. There is curiously no self-reference here, as 
there is greater effort to get the answer due to group incentive.” 


Observer H is thoroughly consistent in reporting no experience 
of self in the group experiments, though he refers rather fre- 
quently in this series to “ visual imagery of own face and of 
faces of others,’ and admits a self-reference in language terms, 
as, for example, “A vocal motor, ‘Let’s see.’ Only in these 
language terms do I get a ‘ self-reference.’ ”’ 

The essential difference between the group experiments and 
the individual experiments in solving problems, is the following, 
according to Observer H’s account. 

“In the group experiments, more inner general constraint (speed 
Aufgabe) visual imagery of others’ faces, and constraint like closing eyes, 
with heightened vocal motor constraint of Aufgabe to speak out the answer 
quickly, a tendency to speak as soon as the stimulus is given. This heightened 
vocal motor strain overbalanced the fine rapport between visual and vocal 
imagery. Hence a blocking, occasioning an even greater confusion with a 
‘self’ as against the ‘others,’ due only to the visual images of the others 


and to auditory imagery of others’ voices speaking out quickly, te., in 
synaesthesic fusion with my own kinaesthesis of time Aufgabe.” 


It is obvious that although Observer H still finds no experi- 
ence of self, “he is growing warmer,” to use a colloquial ex- 
pression. The incompleteness of a description of experience 
which notes only its structural elements is particularly con- 


AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY 63 


spicuous in the attempt to describe ‘“others.’”’ Can any one 
seriously maintain, outside a psychological experiment, that one’s 
experience of “another” is adequately described by a visual 
image of that other, plus an auditory image of that other’s 
voice ? | 

Apparently little observable difference in experience was occa- 
sioned by asking the observers to work through the problem, 
noting the answer in the introspective report, instead of giving 
it orally. Observer F comments in this connection, “ Little dif- 
LeTence, 

Observer H attributes to the former condition, ‘“ perhaps a 
little less visual imagery of other observers and a little less gen- 
eral constraint of a speed Aufgabe—nothing uniquely different, 
however.” Observer M notes, “ More distraction under condi- 
tion of giving answer orally. There was not so much kin- 
aesthetic urge, or need for active agent as ‘me’ to work under 
the later conditions, and more time for consciousness of self.”’ 

Observer R finds no difference in the new method of giving 
the answer, “ except that I was aware that I could now work out 
the problem myself, and felt a little satisfied at that.’ 

In addition to the actual descriptive data contained in this last 
group of reports, we have then some evidence that the self- 
experience is accentuated through group experimentation. 


CRITICAL. SURVEY: OF VINTROSPEGTIV EOREPORTS 


Let us turn then to a consideration of the self-experience itself, 
as we find it set forth in the introspective reports of the three 
observers, who have given descriptions of this type of experience. 

Observer F has contributed out of a total of 74 experiments 
59 reports of the self-experience; Observer M out of a total of 
96 experiments, 67 reports of the experience of self; and 
Observer R, out of a total of 99 experiments, 14 reports of the 
experience of self. In other words, Observer F has reported an 
experience of self in 80 per cent. of the experiments undertaken, 
Observer M in 70 per cent., and Observer R in 14 per cent. 

In order that the effect of practice may be evident in the analysis 
of the self-experience into its component parts, the introspective 
reports of each observer will be divided into three groups follow- 
ing the order of experimentation already described, the first group 
containing reports of the choice and recognition experiments, the 
second group containing reports of the problems solved indi- 
vidually, and the third group containing reports of the problems 
solved in the presence of the other observers. | 

The following table will summarize for Observer F the gen- 
eral structure or pattern of the self-experience, indicating in 
percentages, the number of times a given component occurs in the 
reports included in each of the three groups. 


Observer F 


Group I Group II Group III 
(14 reports) (28 reports) (17 reports) 
Meaning 92% 100% 100% 
Organics 14 64 82 
Kinaesthesis 29 61 82 
Attitude ey 14 12 
verbal 05 me 04 
ian tees tiie 05 a 04 


AN EXPERIMENTAL'STUDY  OPSLHE SELF. IN: PSYCHOLOGY, 65 


Interpretation of Table 

The component most characteristic of the self-experience is 
obviously meaning. The experimenter has classified as mean- 
ings such statements of Observer F as the following. 


December 13 
“TI was conscious of myself in the sense of realizing that I had expert- 
enced a similar situation before and that I was reacting to it in a similar 
manner, And when I thought, ‘I may as well choose one as another,’ I 
thought of myself in the sense that I had no preference and that my choice 
would have no consequences for myself.” 


December 18 
“T was at times conscious that ‘I’ must make this selection; that there 
was an obligation on my part. This was not definitely formulated, but this 
feeling that ‘I’ was responsible for getting this done came to me on two or 
three occasions.” 


February 12 
“ But there was something which meant ‘ I,’—beyond the sub-vocal saying 
Olen ae. 


The following examples illustrate the type of observational 
experience defined in the foregoing tables as attitude. 


December 20 
“T was conscious of my self in setting the task to be done during the 
expiration of the breath. . . . I was somehow vaguely conscious of 
myself all during the act of choice—in the sense of self-effort—that it was 
‘I’ who was making the choice.” 


January 15 
“The feeling of responsibility, destre to maintain self-respect, etc., 
involved self-reference.” 


January 22 
“T was acutely conscious of ‘my’ inability to recognize the design, I felt 
balked, etc.; there was certainly a kind of self-reference, but I can’t get 
atatis 


It will be readily seen that the distinction between meaning and 
attitude is difficult to define with exactness. A study of the 
reports as a whole seems to indicate that attitude in the sense 
employed by the experimenter is a term applicable in some degree 
to the description both of structure and of function, and is as such 


66 ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


made use of by all three observers in describing experience which 
has not been analyzed to the logical limits either of structure alone 
or of meaning alone and which consequently includes aspects of 
both. The nature of the above classification would obviously not 
be greatly altered, were no attempt made by the experimenter to 
maintain this distinction. In the two instances, or 6 per cent. of 
cases noted in Group I, in which meaning is not reported as a 
component part of the self-experience, attitude, as just defined, 
is so reported. 

The foregoing classification emphasizes certain other important 
facts, in addition to the importance attributed to meaning as a 
component part of the self-experience, namely, the fact that as the 
observer becomes more practiced in analysis of the experience 
introspected, the sensory content, which was of less immediate 
observational importance than the meaning aspect of the experi- 
ence, is more frequently reported. Thus organic sensation which 
is reported as a component part of the pattern of self-conscious- 
ness in but 14 per cent. of the experiments included in Group I 
is reported in 64 per cent. of the experiments of Group II, and in 
82 per cent. of the experiments of Group III. Similarly, the 
report of kinaesthetic components increased from 29 per cent. in 
Group I, through 61 per cent. in Group I, to 82 per cent. in 
Group III. It is interesting to note that the type of descriptive 
detail, which has already been designated as attitude, has decreased 
from 5/7 per cent. in Group I to 12 per cent. in Group IT 
indicating that the total experience has, through practice in intro- 
spection, been more successfully differentiated with respect to its 
meaning and content aspects, but it is important to note that the 
meaning aspect is of primary importance throughout. 

Inasmuch as the reports of imagery of various types, chiefly 
verbal and visual, are of such infrequent occurrence with this 
observer, it seems reasonable to conclude that they form an inci- 
dental, rather than an integral or necessary part of the pattern of 
experience which may be described as consciousness of self. 

Finally, the table indicates, when taken as a whole, that con- 
sciousness of self for Observer F is usually an integration of 
meaning, of kinaesthetic, and of organic sensations. 


AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY 67: 


This threefold integration is found in 49 per cent. of all the 
self-experiences of this observer and in 71 per cent. of those 
included in Group III. An integration of either meaning and 
kinaesthetic sensation, or of meaning and organic sensation is 
found in 68 per cent. of all the self-experiences of Observer F 
and in 94 per cent. of the experiences included in Group III. 

When we turn to the reports of Observer M, we find an 
apparently greater difficulty in the interpretation of data, arising 
from the fact that there is more descriptive emphasis upon atti- 
tude. Constant reference is made in the reports of this observer 
to the feeling of compulsion, the feeling of obligation, the feeling 
of activity or of thwarted or blocked activity. The difficulty, 
however, iS more apparent than real, for it has been already 
pointed out that the description of attitude represents a form of 
analysis which retains descriptive terms applicable both to the 
functioning or meaning aspect of consciousness and to its sensory 
content, representing a stage of analysis in which neither aspect 
is analyzed to its logical limit. 

The following table will summarize for Observer M the con- 
figuration of the self-experience. The reports of this observer 
are also divided into three groups, the first representing the self- 
experience as determined by the choice and recognition experi- 
ments, the second by the individual problem experiments and the 
third by the group problem experiments. 


Observer M 
Group I Group IT Group III 

(16 reports) (33 reports) (17 reports) 
Meaning me 03% 
Organics 13% of a. 
Kinaesthesis 94 82 88% 
Attitude 100 97 100 
raprery { verbal 06 .06 


visual ih 09 .06 


68 ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


Interpretation of Table 


The important fact to be noted here is again the importance 
given to the meaning aspect of the self-experience, although the 
report emphasizes attitude rather than meaning. The same incom- 
pleteness of analysis which is responsible for the failure to dis- 
criminate meaning from attitude is shown in the failure to 
discriminate the organic sensations from the _ kinaesthetic. 
Nevertheless, Observer M’s description of the self-experience 
closely resembles that of Observer F in the value it attaches to 
that aspect of the experience, which can be described only in 
meaning terms, in the description of the self-experience as an 
integration of meaning with somatic sensation, and in the inci- 
dental nature of imagery as a component of the total pattern. 
The integration of meaning with organic or kinaesthetic sensation 
is reported in 81 per cent. of all of Observer M’s descriptions of 
the self-experience and in 88 per cent. of the descriptions included 
in Group III, as compared with 68 per cent. and 94 per cent. in 
the corresponding classifications of Observer F’s reports. 

A similar analysis of the descriptive data contained in Observer 
R’s reports of the self-experience, may be summarized as follows, 
but inasmuch as Observer R reported no experiences of self in 
the group experiments in solving problems, the following table 
includes only Groups I and II. 


Observer R 
Group I Group II 
(3 reports) (11 reports) 

Meaning 100% 82% 
Organics A 
Kinaesthesis Ke i 
Attitude a 18 
ete {verbal 67 18 

) visual 33 82 


Interpretation of Table 


Observer R’s description of the self-experience resembles that 
of the two other observers in that meaning is again the most 


AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY 69 


important component of the experience. The striking difference 
in description is the importance attributed to imagery of different 
kinds, in contrast to the reports of Observers F and M in which 
somatic sensations were emphasized as important aspects of the 
total pattern of self-consciousness. 

The conclusion to be drawn from this difference is apparently 
the fact that meaning is the one essential aspect of the self-experi- 
ence, but that when such an experience is analyzed from the point 
of view of content, the sensory detail, which then becomes observ- 
able, may be variously distributed within the total pattern. 

The fact that meaning is the essential characteristic of the 
self-experience is further substantiated by the fact that Observer 
H, who has reported no meanings, except in terms of kinaesthetic 
complexes, is the only observer who has failed to report a self- 
experience. 


Results 


Configuration of Self-Experience 


The conclusion to be drawn from the descriptive data contained 
in the reports of Observers F, M, and R, is, therefore, that the 
self-experience is not a simple, unanalyzable experience but a 
complex integration of the perceptual type, an integration of 
sensation with meaning, of image with meaning or of both sensa- 
tion and image with meaning, whose characteristic feature is 
meaning. When sensations or images or both are logically 
organized with reference to the past or total activity of an 
organism, and when this logical organization is in the focus of 
attention together with sensations and images, we have a pattern 
of consciousness which may be described as a consciousness of 
self. Meaning throughout these reports is described as an experi- 
ential, observational factor of the total pattern. 

The accompanying table presents a chart showing for each 
observer the distribution of self-experiences throughout the course 
of experimentation. 


ELISABETH WHEELER AMEN 


70 


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AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE SELF IN PSYCHOLOGY 71 


Distribution of the Self-Experience 


The following facts regarding the distribution of the self- 
experience are deducible from this chart. | 

I. No one observer is at all times self-conscious, the reports 
of consciousness of self varying from 80 per cent. of the experi- 
ments undertaken in the case of Observer F through 67 per cent. 
in the case of Observer M, 14 per cent. in the case of Observer R, 
to O per cent. in the case of Observer H. 

Il. There are obvious and striking differences among the dif- 
ferent observers in the extent to which consciousness is integrated 
into patterns exhibiting the self-configuration, depending pri- 
marily upon the degree of organization of experience with refer- 
ence to the total activity of the organism, and secondarily upon 
the freedom and completeness of introspective report. 

III. Consciousness of self is characteristic of different experi- 
ences in different degrees, the recognition experiments contribut- 
ing the smallest number of self-experiences for each observer, the 
choice experiments a greater number and the problem experiments 
the greatest number, although, as has already been pointed out in 
an earlier section, there is some variation from this order in the 
series of group-problem experiments, as indicated in the accom- 
panying table. 


Individual Group 
Recognition Choice Problems Problems 
Frazier 36% 77% 93% 85% 
(more vivid) 
Murphy 40 63 70 85 
Roback 10 14 20 


IV. There is some evidence that the increased number of self- 
experiences in the problem experiments is due to the introduction 
of a social factor in the experimental situation, and that when 
this factor is further strengthened through group experimenta- 
tion, the self-experience is thereby to some extent accentuated. 


CONCLUSION 


(1) In answer then to the problem which was the chief object 
of investigation in this dissertation, namely, whether there is an 
immediate, unanalyzable experience of self in Miss Calkins’s sense 
of the term “ self,” which is observable to introspection, it must 
be granted that there is an immediate experience of self observable 
to introspection, which is analyzable into meaning, imaginal and 
sensory components, which are, however, integrated in concrete 
experience in a unitary existential whole. Whenever, to repeat 
what has already been said, sensations or images or both are 
logically organized with reference to the past or total activity of 
an organism, and when this logical organization is in the focus 
of attention together with sensations and images, we have a 
pattern or configuration of consciousness which may be described 
as a consciousness of self. 

(2) The descriptive terms most frequently used by Miss Cal- 
kins in her characterization of the self as “ persistent,” ‘‘ unique,”’ 
“fundamental or basal to its experiences,’ and “related to its 
environment’ are not the terms in which the observers in this 
experiment have characterized the self-experience. The experi- 
ence is throughout this dissertation consistently described in terms 
of a meaning-sensory-imaginal complex of the perceptual order 
orety pe: 

(3) Consciousness of self is not present in all experience, but 
an introspective determination toward the observation of experi- 
ence from the point of view of the concrete whole, rather than 
of the part, favors the occurrence of the self-experience. There 
is some evidence also that the “social factor” in a situation to 
some degree determines the experience of self. 

Finally, the consciousness of self accompanies experience of 
different kinds with different degrees of frequency. Among the 
types of experience investigated in this dissertation, the self- 
experience occurs more readily in the problem experiment than 
in the choice experiment, and more frequently in the choice experi- 
ment than in the recognition experiment. 

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